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INHUMAN COPYRIGHT SCENE:
THE FORGOTTEN LAW OF ART IN THE HOLOCAUST
Lior Zemer* & Anat Lior**
Abstract
Artists, authors, musicians, and other creative individuals formed an
integral part of the horrific life in the ghettos, concentration camps, and
extermination camps during the Holocaust. Through their works, Jewish
prisoners documented the atrocities of the Nazis and exposed the untold
stories of six million Jews who walked or labored to death. The vast
majority of the authors of these works were murdered in gas chambers,
labor camps, and ghettos. While much has been written about looted works
of art, which were stolen from Jewish families during the Nazi occupation,
this material covers only one limited subset of questions relating to
ownership of works owned or created by Jews during the Holocaust.
Scholarship on art and authorship in the Holocaust has failed to legally
and morally explore the works that were created in the most extreme
circumstances under which copyrighted works have ever been created.
This Article aims to remedy this lack of awareness. The Article opens a
debate that has no comparable example in human history.
The lack of social and legal discourse on property rights vested in
works created within the ghettos and concentration camps has created
legal anomalies that perpetuate historical injustice. These anomalies,
disguised as copyright rules, prohibit legal owners of these works from
claiming their rights and restrict public access to these works, while
permitting public bodies (such as European and international museums
and archives) to make repositories of these works, to declare ownership
of the works, and to patronize their social fate and unprecedented
historical value. This Article aims to reconcile the unexplored tension
between the authorial rights in these works and the public interest in
accessing and learning from them. Copyright laws protect and incentivize
access to and use of creative voices vested in cultural commodities in a
manner that is mutually beneficial to creators and communities of
listeners. The creative voices of Jewish prisoners in the ghettos and
*
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concentration camps have been continuously silenced since the end of the
Holocaust. From the moment they were stripped of their basic humanity
in the ghettos until now, more than seventy years later, authors, artists,
musicians, theatrical and opera playwrights, and stage actors have yet to
receive legal protection in their works.
This Article offers the first inquiry into the fundamental law of ghetto
art. The Article focuses on works created by Jewish prisoners in the
ghettos, concentration camps, and extermination camps, with the aim to
expose the many flaws in the way contemporary copyright laws are used
to hold these works captive in institutions where they do not belong, rather
than freeing them to the public in order to raise awareness, provide moral
respect to their authors, rescue them from illegitimate owners, and deliver
historical justice. As the third-generation of Holocaust survivors, we find
this Article a moral duty. It is a duty that travels through works of art,
music, and authorship and tells the many stories that the creators of the
works could not tell. The unsettling findings of our research call for a
reassessment of the common standards applied to the use and ownership
of copyrighted works created during the Holocaust within the ghettos and
concentration and extermination camps—in the most inhuman copyright
scene humanity has ever created.
INTRODUCTION
As a prisoner in Auschwitz, Dina Gottliebova Babbitt was forced by Josef
Mengele, the “Angel of Death,” to paint watercolors of the haggard faces of Gypsy
prisoners.1 “Seven of the eleven portraits that saved Mrs. Babbitt and her mother”
were later discovered and “display[ed] at the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and
Museum in Poland.”2 Dina requested ownership of the eleven portraits before she
passed away in 2009, but her petitions were denied.3 “They are definitely my own
paintings; they belong to me, my soul is in them, and without these paintings I
wouldn’t be alive.”4 Many attempts were made to reclaim Dina’s ownership in the
portraits, including a 2001 Resolution of the United States House of Representatives
calling on President George W. Bush to make all efforts to assist Dina’s legitimate

1

Steve Friess, History Claims Her Artwork, but She Wants It Back, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/30/arts/design/30surv.html
[https://perma.cc/BZ8Z-NKLG]; David B. Green, This Day in Jewish History // 1923: Czech
Woman Who Drew Fellow Auschwitz Inmates Is Born, HAARETZ (Jan. 21, 2014),
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-1923-auschwitz-artist-is-born-1.5313700
[https://perma.cc/L86A-6DPQ].
2
Friess, supra note 1.
3
Larry Gordon, Art or a Part of History?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 29, 2006, 12:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-nov-29-et-babbitt29-story.html
[https://perma.cc/XMT8-ZFCZ].
4
Friess, supra note 1.
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claim.5 The Auschwitz Museum, which considers the watercolor artworks to be its
property, has argued that they are rare artifacts and important evidence of the Nazi
genocide.
In one of the exchanges between Congresswoman Shelley Berkeley and the
Polish ambassador to the U.S., Przemyslaw Grudzinski, the former wrote: “Let’s be
clear from the start. The pictures painted by Dina Babbitt do not belong to the whole
world.”6 Here lies the most difficult moral conflict in copyright—a conflict that has
never been explored in legal scholarship. The portraits, like all other artifacts created
within the ghettos and concertation camps (hereinafter: ‘Holocaust art’ or ‘ghetto
art’), provide evidence of the inhuman atrocities and genocide committed against
the Jewish population of Europe during the Nazi occupation. They tell authentic
stories that every member of the human community must know. These stories cannot
be altered, changed, or destroyed; they draw the limits of humanity. As such, a work
of art and authorship that was created within the ghettos and concentration camps
must be made available to the public in its original form. At the same time, such
works are unquestionably their respective creators’ exclusive property. The eleven
portraits painted by Gottliebova were commissioned under terms of slavery.
Gottliebova’s art is a form of testimony.7 When art is created under extreme
circumstances, its message to the outer world is unparalleled. On the one hand, it is
for the artists and authors to dictate how this message is to be displayed, told, and
remain alive. On the other hand, the public en masse holds a moral right to learn
from these works and a moral duty to take part in maintaining their authentic
message and meaning.
Daniele Israel spent months in jail in Trieste before being deported to
Auschwitz.8 While in prison, he wrote letters to his wife, Anna, and two sons, Dario
and Vittorio.9 These letters, which only recently came to light, paint a deeply moving
portrait of a family shattered by the Holocaust.10 His two sons described the way
their father used to send letters from his cell in Trieste’s Coroneo prison—by
stitching them into his dirty shirts that were sent to the laundry.11 Two of his former
employees would deliver them to the hiding place of his wife and two sons.12 These
employees would later deliver the shirts back to Daniele with his wife’s reply.13
5
LIDIA OSTAŁOWSKA, WATERCOLOURS: A STORY FROM AUSCHWITZ 167, 216–17
(2016).
6
Id. at 217.
7
TESTIMONY – ART OF THE HOLOCAUST (Irit Salmon-Livne, Ilana Guri & Yitzchak
Mais eds., 1986). In this Article, we use the term “art” generally, encompassing all forms of
copyrighted expressions created within the ghettos and concentration camps.
8
Letters of Love: ‘Our Father Wrote Every Day as He Waited to Be Sent to Auschwitz,’
BBC (Jul. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-53358123 [https://perma.cc/AP869BW6] [hereinafter, Letters of Love].
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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Although SS officials often interrogated Daniele about the whereabouts of his
family, he did not reveal their location despite being tortured.14 After each
interrogation, he would write a letter to his family describing what had happened.15
Even though Anna was able to preserve all of Daniele’s 250 letters, none of her
replies survived the war.16 Daniele destroyed each of them after reading them in
order to avoid being discovered. He sent the last letter from his train heading to
Auschwitz in September 1944 with his parents-in-law.17 In that last letter, he wrote:
“From the distance you can see the smoke. There’s so much smoke here. This is
hell.”18 These letters are copyrighted works, and today, the original letters are kept
in Yad Vashem and available to the public.19
In January 2021, a drawing of the Compiègne concentration camp in France
authored by camp inmate Abraham Berline was auctioned in Jerusalem for the
bidding price of $8,000.20 Berline was held at the Compiègne concentration camp in
1941 for seven months.21 Under difficult conditions, he created a painting of the
camp, including the camp’s watchtower and prison booths.22 Because no paper was
available, Berline used eggshells from the scraps Jewish inmates were given as
food.23 He attached them to a wooden plate he found in the camp.24 In 1942, he was
transferred to Auschwitz, where he was murdered along with his wife.25 Yad
Vashem heavily criticized the auction stating that such artifacts must not be used as
a commodity for the sole purpose of profit, and that they belong at Yad Vashem
where they can be preserved, serving as historical testimony and as a vessel for
presenting authentic inhuman moments of the Holocaust.26

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.; see also Secret Letters of a Jewish Family Torn Apart by the Holocaust
Rediscovered, WJC (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/secretletters-of-a-jewish-family-torn-apart-by-the-holocaust-rediscovered-8-3-2020 [https://perm
a.cc/6GDM-U955] [hereinafter Secret Letters].
19
Letters of Love, supra note 8.
20
For the auction house bidding page for this work, see A drawing of the Compiègne
concentration camp on eggshells by camp inmate Abraham Berlin. Compiegne Camp France, 1941, BIDSPIRIT, https://il.bidspirit.com/ui/lotPage/source/search/auction/13121/lot
/19869 [https://perma.cc/6T8V-ZJXK] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Abraham Berline, ACADEMIC, https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/5346817
[https://perma.cc/CSK2-YKLR] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
26
Itamar Eichner, Rare Documentation: He Painted the Concentration Camp on
Eggshells – and Was Murdered in Auschwitz, YNET (Jan. 7, 2021, 9:42 AM),
https://www.ynet.co.il/judaism/article/r1Ct9oNCP [https://perma.cc/2GNL-728F]; Eli
15
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The relationship between art and the Holocaust has been debated for years,
often through the case studies of scholars examining restitution claims from Jewish
families whose properties were plundered by the Nazis and subsequently lost. The
legal challenge presented by looted art centers around property rights in tangible and
movable properties. Artworks that were stolen from Jewish families during the war
have serious aggregated monetary and financial implications. However, this issue
lacks the unique personal connection of an author to his work; looted artworks
cannot tell the authentic story of what happened within the ghettos and concentration
camps. This Article offers the first inquiry into the fundamental law of ghetto art.
The Article focuses on works created by Jewish prisoners in the ghettos,
concentration camps, and extermination camps, with the aim to expose the many
flaws in the way contemporary copyright laws are used to hold these works captive
in institutions where they do not belong, rather than freeing them to the public in
order to raise awareness, provide moral respect to their authors, rescue the works
from illegitimate owners, and deliver historical justice. Creating art, from portraits
and diaries, to musical and theatrical works, provided an emotional haven to Jewish
prisoners at their most difficult time. Soon there will be no Holocaust survivors left
to share their stories of the atrocities that they experienced as a warning tale to us
all.27 These artworks provide unique dialogical platforms reflecting authentic
inhuman historical moments. These works are invaluable as they will continue to
serve as the only remaining authentic message Holocaust survivors and victims have
left to give to future generations.
Following this introduction, Part I presents the unbearable and inhuman
copyright scene that existed in ghettos and concentration camps. Part II describes
the historical background of the Nazi plunder and retraces the global legal efforts of
restitution for Jewish communities after the Holocaust. Part II also highlights the
error in focusing on Nazi plunder only, leaving the art scene in the ghettos
unexplored. Part III examines the dialogical importance and effects of artworks that
were created within the ghettos and concentration camps and emphasizes the unique
authorial intimacy of the creators to their works. Part IV challenges existing
doctrinal remedies through which copyright laws balance authors’ rights and the
public interest. Further, Part IV offers a comparative examination of the fair use
doctrine, orphan works, perpetual rights, and the resale right. Part V analyzes and
highlights the deficiencies embedded in ordinary and common copyright standards
and their inapplicability to Holocaust art. Part V also advocates for the application
of the unique public interest defense enacted in British copyright law and further
justifies our claim that copyright works involve duties to the public as well as rights
in the work. Prior to concluding, Part VI delves into the role of moral rights with
Ashkenazi, A Painting of the Eggshells that Hides Years of Subversive Creation in the
Concentration Camps, WALLA NEWS (Jan. 9, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://news.walla.co.il/item/
3409482 [https://perma.cc/G4XF-L3H4].
27
Ayelet Gundar-Goshen, ‘You Shall Never Be a Bystander.’ How We Learn About the
Holocaust When the Last Survivors Are Gone, TIME (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://time.com/5772511/learn-holocaust-last-survivors-gone/
[https://perma.cc/GKB2LFHH].
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regards to works created within the ghettos and concentration camps, as well as the
limited right to destroy these works versus the unlimited right for ownership by their
authors and artists. This final Part also advocates for the use of compulsory licenses
in a manner that safeguards the public interest along with the authors’ rights to own
their works.
As the third-generation of Holocaust survivors, we find this Article an
overwhelming emotional journey. It is a journey that travels through works of art,
music, and authorship all of which tell the many stories that their creators could not
tell. The unsettling findings of our research call for a reassessment of the common
standards applied to the use and ownership of copyrighted works created during the
Holocaust within the ghettos, concentration camps, and extermination camps. We
argue that a fundamental law of Holocaust art must be declared and adopted, one
that encompasses all creative expressions created in these horrific places. Artworks
remaining from the Holocaust stand as silent memorials to a time when human
beings were deprived of their basic humanity. This law will cherish, commemorate,
and protect these works as one of the most important parts of human history.
I. INHUMAN COPYRIGHT SCENE
As creative works of self-expression and unparalleled emotional attachment,
works of art and authorship created in the Holocaust by Jewish prisoners took many
forms, including, inter alia: diaries,28 notes, sketches, musical compositions and
marches,29 plays,30 paintings, portraits, poems, sculptures,31 newspapers, novels,
books, and letters. Gottliebova, Israel, and Berline show the unique emotional
attachment of authors to the works they created in the ghettos and the authors’
unbelievable and heroic attempts to remain cultural and human through creatively
expressing themselves, without knowing who would live to see the next day.
Together, these and the examples provided below define the most inhuman
copyright scene humanity has ever created.

28

The most famous diary is of Anne Frank. See generally ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF

A YOUNG GIRL (1947).

29
See, e.g., The Birkenau Women’s Camp Orchestra, FACING HISTORY AND
OURSELVES,
https://www.facinghistory.org/music-memory-and-resistance-duringholocaust/birkenau-womens-camp-orchestra [https://perma.cc/5F3V-K5X8] (last visited
Sept. 8, 2021).
30
See Theatre of the Camps & Ghettos, HOLOCAUST ONLINE,
https://holocaustonline.org/theatre-of-the-camps-ghettos/ [https://perma.cc/7FKS-M9SQ]
(last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
31
An example for a sculpture in the form of a doll, is “A Figurine of the Devil” (1941–
1944). This doll was manufactured in Auschwitz from ribbon and a piece of wire. With help
from the Resistance Movement, the figurine was used to smuggle secret messages out of the
camp. See Wendy Soderburg, Inmates’ Once-Hidden Artwork Offers Poignant Look at
Concentration Camp Life, UCLA NEWSROOM (Jan. 11, 2013), https://newsroom.ucla.edu/
stories/a-poignant-look-at-concentration-242585 [https://perma.cc/7EC9-ZESX].
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Felix Nussbaum was a German-Jewish surrealist painter.32 In 1940, he was
arrested and sent to the camp of Saint Cyprein in southern France.33 Miraculously,
he managed to escape the camp and lived in hiding in Brussels until he was caught
in 1944.34 Shortly thereafter, he was sent to Auschwitz with his wife, where they
were murdered.35 While in hiding, Nussbaum authored several paintings depicting
his fear of persecution and death—“Nussbaum’s artwork began to express his
overwhelming feelings of dread, melancholy, persecution, and the approach of
death, although occasionally portraying symbols of a fragile optimism.”36 He drew
a self-portrait in 1943 titled “Self Portrait with Jewish Identity Card.”37 Unlike in his
previous works, where the symbols of Jewish identity, such as the star of David and
prayer shawls, had meaning that stemmed from his strong Jewish faith, these
symbols in the 1943 self-portrait embodied the sense of persecution and degradation
which were imposed on Nussbaum solely for being a Jew.38 As Elsby aptly phrases
in her review of Nussbaum’s work, “By seeing Felix Nussbaum’s artwork, and
trying to understand its messages, we honor one of his last wishes: that after his
death, his artwork would not die with him.”39 Bedřich Fritta was a Czech-Jewish
artist and cartoonist who was murdered in Auschwitz in 1944.40 In 1941 he was sent

32

Yehudit Shendar, Senior Curator, Felix Nussbaum 1904–1944 – The Fate of a Jewish
Artist, YAD VASHEM, https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/nussbaum/about_nuss
baum.asp [https://perma.cc/2ZJP-VHYR] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Liz Elsby, Felix Nussbaum: Self Portraits of a Jew in Turmoil, YAD VASHEM,
https://www.yadvashem.org/articles/general/felix-nussbaum.html [https://perma.cc/VKW4BU3Q] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
37
Self
Portrait
with
Jewish
Identity
Card,
NEUE
GALERIE,
https://www.neuegalerie.org/content/self-portrait-jewish-identity-card [https://perma.cc/G8
FN-YRHC] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
38
Elsby, supra note 36 (“Turning his head to visually engage the viewer, Nussbaum
seems to have been cornered next to a crumbling and dirty white wall (a symbol of menace
in Nussbaum’s visual vocabulary). Lifting his coat collar up, he reveals the yellow badge of
shame concealed under it, while his left hand shows us his Jewish identity card. His
expression is furtive, alert, his direct gaze is penetrating. What does it mean to us as viewers?
Is it a conspiratorial gaze, asking us to help keep the secret of his Jewish identity? Is it the
gaze of the accuser, demanding from the viewer answers as to why he has been allowed to
be so humiliated and persecuted? Is this the terrified face his persecutors will see when he is
eventually arrested in July, 1944? Or perhaps, 17 years after first painting himself as a Jew,
he again asks the viewer to consider the implications of what it means to be a Jew at this
point in history, with the threat of annihilation looming so close.”).
39
Id.
40
Bedřich Fritta – Drawings from the Theresienstadt Ghetto, JÜDISCHES MUSEUM
BERLIN, https://www.jmberlin.de/en/exhibition-bedrich-fritta [https://perma.cc/HFH8KPMM] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
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to the Theresienstadt Ghetto with his wife and three-year-old son.41 He was
appointed the director of the painting section, where he and fellow artists created
graphic prints as propaganda material for the Nazis.42 Secretly, they also authored
clandestine paintings and drawings describing the horrific reality of the ghetto.43
Some of these artworks were smuggled out of the ghetto but were captured and
destroyed by the Nazis.44 Fritta was deported to Auschwitz in 1944.45 After
liberation, two hundred of his artworks were discovered in the Theresienstadt ghetto,
where he hid them behind the brick walls.46 During his time at the ghetto, Fritta
painted “Rear Entrance,” which was presented in an exhibition in Berlin in 2016.47
A curator of this exhibition explained his interpretation of the painting as, “The halfopen gate is a metaphor for death, there is no visible alternative, the only way out is
into the darkness . . . He shows architecture and empty nature as a stage for an event
that is itself invisible.”48
Art and literature were not the only cultural and creative activities within the
ghettos and concentration camps. Theatres, including comedic theater,49 and music
were also part of the prisoners’ attempts to remain cultural and human.50 Theater
survived because it was “seen as [a] vital act[] of resistance, with satire as the main
ingredient of camp cabarets.”51 For example, a theatre in the Vilna ghetto continued
to actively perform until its liquidation in 1943.52 During April 1942, the ghetto’s
theater performed, inter alia, a production of “Shlomo Molcho” and was able to
41

Art from the Holocaust, Works from the Yad Vashem Collection, Bedřich Fritta
(Friedrich Taussig), YAD VASHEM, https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/art/fritta
.asp [https://perma.cc/U9DL-XHUK] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Art from the Holocaust: The Stories Behind the Images, BBC,
https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20160203-art-from-the-holocaust-the-stories-behindthe-images [https://perma.cc/7H7W-3A6Q] (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
48
Thomas Rogers, A New Exhibition in Berlin Explores the Grim Realities of Life for
Jews in Nazi Camps and Ghettoes. Thomas Rogers Meets One of Its Curators, BBC
CULTURE (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/culture/article/20160203-art-from-theholocaust-the-stories-behind-the-images [https://perma.cc/T93J-B49K].
49
Robin J. Knepp, Laughing Together: Comedic Theatre as a Mechanism of Survival
during the Holocaust (2013) (M.F.A. thesis, Virginia Commonwealth University).
50
Jon Wertheim, Prisoners in Nazi Concentration Camps Made Music; Now It’s Being
Discovered and Performed, CBS NEWS (June 7, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
holocaust-prisoners-in-nazi-concentration-camps-made-music-now-being-discovered-andperformed-60-minutes-2020-06-07/ [https://perma.cc/B4Q9-9DME].
51
Alvin Goldfarb, Theatrical Activities in Nazi Concentration Camps, 1 PERFORMING
ARTS J. 3, 10 (1976).
52
Vilna During the Holocaust, THE JERUSALEM OF LITHUANIA,
https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/vilna/during/ghetto_last_days.asp
[https://perma.cc/2YSE-M5FW] (last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
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maintain an active puppet theatre.53 In 1942 alone, 120 performances were carried
out in the ghetto’s theater in front of 38,000 viewers.54 The first major exhibition
focusing on theater in concentration camps took place in 2018 at the Museum of
Contemporary Art in Krakow, Poland, and indicated the fundamental social and
cultural role theaters played in those places.55 The exhibition displayed notes, letters,
sketches, drawings, masks, and even puppets for a 1944 New Year cabaret staged in
the Stutthof concentration camp near Gdansk.56
Music was not an uncommon cultural activity in the ghettos and concentration
camps.57 New songs were written, including “topical songs inspired by the latest
gossip and news, and songs of personal expression that often concerned the loss of
family and home.”58 For example, playwright Jura Soyfer and composer Herbert
Zipper coauthored the “Dachau Song” in 1938 “as an ironic response to the motto
‘Arbeit Macht Frei’ (Work Makes Freedom) inscribed on the gate at the entrance to
53

See Ghetto–The Last Performance in the Vilna Ghetto, PLAYBILL,
https://www.playbill.com/production/ghetto-circle-in-the-square-theatre-vault-0000003251
[https://perma.cc/WX4U-RJZM] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (describing a Broadway show
where “[a] theatre troupe proves unexpectedly popular in a Jewish ghetto in Vilna, Lithuania,
shortly after many of its residents have been murdered by the Nazis.”).
54
Vilna During the Holocaust, Daily Life in the Vilna Ghetto, Theatre and Music in the
Ghetto, YAD VASHEM, https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/vilna/during/theatre.
asp [https://perma.cc/WUV2-GTZE] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022).
55
Lagertheater, MUSEUM OF CONTEMP. ART IN KRAKOW (MOCAK),
https://n.mocak.pl/lagertheater [https://perma.cc/RF8C-FGFR] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
56
See id.; an important example of theatre work in the Holocaust is that of the Ovitz
family and their Lilliput tour. See, e.g., YEHUDA KOREN & EILAT NEGEV, IN OUR HEARTS
WE WERE GIANTS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE LILLIPUT TROUPE–A DWARF FAMILY’S
SURVIVAL OF THE HOLOCAUST (2004); Yehuda Koren & Eilat Negev, The Dwarves of
Auschwitz, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/mar/23/the-dwarves-of-auschwitz [https://perma.cc/ZGU7-LRHK]; YEHUDA KOREN
& EILAT NEGEV, GIANTS: THE DWARFS OF AUSCHWITZ–THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF
THE LILLIPUT TROUPE (2013).
57
For more about music originated during the Holocaust by Jewish prisoners and
inmates see Music of the Holocaust, YAD VASHEM, https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhib
itions/music/index.asp [https://perma.cc/TUM5-RQC8]; SHIRLI GILBERT, MUSIC IN THE
HOLOCAUST: CONFRONTING LIFE IN THE NAZI GHETTOS AND CAMPS (2005); A very famous
song written in Vilna Ghetto is the Yiddish song Shtiler Shtiler—a powerful song that’s
become one of the most sung Holocaust songs in memorial ceremonies today. ADRIENNE
COOPER, SHTILER SHTILER (Flying Fish Records 1989); Shtiler Shtiler, MUSIC AND THE
HOLOCAUST, https://holocaustmusic.ort.org/places/ghettos/vilna/shtiler-shtiler/ [https://per
ma.cc/GFM6-RQ4E] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021); see also PONAR (Israel Film Center 2002)
https://israelfilmcenterstream.org/film/ponar/ [https://perma.cc/F69E-PJQJ] (last visited on
Sept. 22, 2021) (describing a film directed by Racheli Schwartz that portrays the creation of
the song Ponar or Shtilar, Shtilar in Yiddish).
58
Music of the Holocaust, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/collections/the-museums-collections/collections-highlights/musicof-the-holocaust-highlights-from-the-collection/music-of-the-holocaust [https://perma.cc/
W4FB-M9NX] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
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the camp.”59 Avrom Akselrod and Mark Warshawsky coauthored “By The Ghetto
Gate” in 1941 at Kovno Ghetto, which was “a topical song about food smuggling.”60
While collecting information about music in the ghettos, Guido Fackler remarked
that choirs and choral groups were also prevalent in the early days of the
concentration camps and that:
Inmate bands shaped the musical life of the larger concentration
camps. . . . With the expansion of the camp system and the founding of a
satellite system of subcamps, official orchestras existed in almost all of the
main concentration camps, larger subcamps and in some death camps.
Sometimes there were several ensembles in one place, such as in
Auschwitz, among them a brass band comprising 120 musicians and a
symphony orchestra with 80 musicians.61
In 2020, a seminar was taught in the Exilarte Center discussing European music
in the Holocaust.62 One of the seminar’s objectives was to show “the plurality of
music that was prevented and destroyed by the Nazi seizure of power.”63 These are
only a few of the innumerable heart-wrenching stories that demonstrate the mayhem
that possessed Europe during the reign of the Nazi party and its brutal, bewildering
effects on the cultural wealth and prosperity that once characterized a significant
part of Jewish Diaspora.
Copyright law is meant to protect authors and incentivize them to use their
voices in a manner that is mutually beneficial to them as creators and to us as
communities of listeners.64 The voices of Jewish prisoners in concentration camps
and ghettos have been continuously silenced from the moment that they were
deprived of their rights, through today—as their works have yet to receive rightful
protection. Copyright law has failed its main purpose to free knowledge from
59

Dachau Song (Dachau Lied), U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/collections/the-museums-collections/collections-highlights/musicof-the-holocaust-highlights-from-the-collection/music-of-the-holocaust/dachau-song
[https://perma.cc/23HR-P2GP] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
60
By the Ghetto Gate (Baym Geto Toyerl), U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/collections/the-museums-collections/collections-highlights/musicof-the-holocaust-highlights-from-the-collection/music-of-the-holocaust/by-the-ghetto-gate
[https://perma.cc/WA5G-EESB] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
61
Guido Fackler, The Concertation and Death Camps, MUSIC AND THE HOLOCAUST,
https://holocaustmusic.ort.org/places/camps/ [https://perma.cc/V9YE-VBGT] (last visited
Sept. 8, 2021).
62
See Forbidden Music – “Jewish Destiny” and the Defiance of Richard Fuchs,
EXILARTE, https://exilarte.org/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/X8CA-QPB8] (last visited Sept.
22, 2021).
63
Expelled, Persecuted, Banned – European Music and the Consequences of National
Socialism, EXILARTE, https://exilarte.org/expelled-persecuted-banned-european-music-andthe-consequences-of-national-socialism?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/LRE9-Y2F8]
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2021).
64
See Lior Zemer, Dialogical Transactions, 95 OR. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2016).
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illegitimate control and allow lessons to be gleaned from history. A significant
portion of the works created in concentration camps and ghettos are held today in
archives, libraries, museums, and other official facilities, some of which are closed
to the public. The testimony of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum before the
U.S. Congress was astonishing. The legal counsel of the Museum stated that the
Museum would not make its works available to the public due to copyright
concerns.65 From an emotional point of view, most of these works are held by
institutions that operate in the countries that legalized antisemitic activities, denied
Jewish authors and artists their basic rights, and forced them to walk to their death.
This emotional point of view must, as this Article provides, be translated into legal
rules.
The current legislation which governs these works, including modern copyright
law, withholds the works from their legitimate owners and potential users by
referring to ordinary laws and international conventions that might be suitable in
times of peace but cannot, as we argue, apply to Holocaust art. An example is Article
2(6) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,66
according to which the first owner of a copyrighted work is its author, unless
otherwise indicated.67 Most of the literary, musical, artistic, and dramatic works
created within the ghettos and concentration camps have neither a living nor known
owner nor a recognized legal heir. Only the rightsholders of the artworks have the
legal capacity to change the works or issue licenses to use or display them publicly.68
Article 2(2) of this Convention stipulates that ownership shall be governed
according to the country of residence.69 In the case of works created during the
Holocaust, the country of residence can be Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, the
Baltic States, Hungary, Greece, Slovakia, Romania, Austria, Luxembourg, or one of
65
Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interests of Copyright Owners
and Users: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Cts., the Internet & Intell. Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 62–67 (2008), https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
orphan-hearing-3-10-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EXK-L4CT] (statement of Karen C. Coe,
Associate Legal Counsel, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum); see also Rights and
Reproductions, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/collections/ask
-a-research-question/rights-and-reproductions [https://perma.cc/CY3S-YYFR] (last visited
Sept. 9, 2021) (providing information on the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s
copyright policy today).
66
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(1), Sept. 9, 1886, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979
(defining “protected works” as literary and artistic works that “include every production in
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression”).
67
Id. art. 2(6); see also World Trade Organization, The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994.
68
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 780 (2001); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of
Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 717, 783 (2009).
69
See World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 66, at art. 2(2).
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the many other countries under Nazi occupation that deported their Jewish nationals
to concentration and extermination camps. Germany signed the Berne Convention
in 1887, and Poland signed it in 1920.70 Under this treaty, works by Jewish prisoners
in ghettos and concentration camps belong to these countries as countries of
residence. Accordingly, the works created by Gottliebova, Israel, Berline,
Nussbaum, Fritta, Soyfer, Zipper, Axelrod, and Warshawsky belong to those
countries where their families were murdered in gas chambers, where their lives
ended. This is the outrageous outcome on which the Auschwitz Museum bases its
property claim over Gottliebova’s eleven portraits. This outcome may rightfully
apply in times of peace, but it is morally and legally disturbing and inapplicable as
a rule to commemorate the orchestration of mass killing ending with over six million
Jews murdered.
II. THE FOCUS ON NAZI PLUNDER
The relationship between art and the Holocaust has been debated for years,
mostly through many case studies by scholars examining restitution claims from
Jewish families whose properties were plundered by the Nazis and subsequently
lost.71 This includes famous paintings, such as Klimt’s Woman in Gold,72 and art by
70

WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne Convention (Total
Contracting Parties: 179), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15
[https://perma.cc/2THP3KGK] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
71
BRUCE L. HAY, NAZI-LOOTED ART AND THE LAW (2017) (examining case law on
looted art from the Holocaust, which was litigated in the U.S.). See, e.g., United States v.
Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Westfield v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 633 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2011); Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 2007); Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010); Cassirer
v. Kingdom of Spain & Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir.
2010); Grosz v. Museum of Mod. Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Bakalar v.
Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010); Museum of Fine Arts Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); Schoeps v. Museum of Mod. Art, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); De Csepel v. Republic of Hung., 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Detroit Inst. of Arts
& Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Detroit Inst. of
Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28364 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Vineberg v.
Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008).
72
In this case, the Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I, painted by Gustav Klimt, was in the
center of a legal dispute between Maria Altmann, the niece of the original owner and subject
of the painting, and the Austrian government. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S.
677 (2004); Otto Waechter & Petra Fizimayear, Stolen Masters: The Sale of Stolen and
Plundered Art – An Austrian Perspective, 25 AUT INT’L L. PRACTICUM 167 (2012); ANNEMARIE O’CONNOR, THE LADY IN GOLD: THE EXTRAORDINARY TALE OF GUSTAVE KLIMT’S
MASTERPIECE, PORTRAIT OF ADELE BLOCH-BAUER (2012); Jeremiah R. Blocker, Legal
Perspectives on the Holocaust Artwork Recovery Claims and Modern Law: Contemporary
Issues from the Holocaust, 21 TRINITY L. REV. 1 (2016); Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and
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world-renowned artists seized by the Nazis. A complex array of international laws,
statutes of limitation, and national confidentiality regulations have prevented the
timely return of artifacts to their lawful owners.73 The media still unearths these
stories quite frequently, even more than seventy years after the war ended.74 A recent
report in The Guardian focusing on John Constable’s Dedham From Langham
(1813) stated that “Nazi loot carries a legacy of hate. And that is why a Swiss art
museum is wrong to refuse to return a painting by John Constable to the despoiled
owner’s rightful heirs.”75 The current possessor, the Musée des Beaux-Arts in La

Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes: Recovery of Art Looted During the Holocaust, 14
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 243 (2006); see also LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE
OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR (1994) (presenting a broad review of the Nazis’ actions since they first gained
power until the end of the war, including legal struggles Jewish survivors and their families
conducted against Germany and its former allies).
73
See, e.g., Jessica Grimes, Forgotten Prisoners of War: Returning Nazi-Looted Art by
Relaxing the National Stolen Property Act, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REV. 521, 526
(2010).
74
See, e.g., Judge Rules Museum ‘Rightfully Owns’ Nazi-Looted Painting, BBC (May
1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48118342 [https://perma.cc/62K5TVWF]; Daniel Boffey, Dutch Museums Discover 170 Artworks Stolen by Nazis, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/10/dutch-museums-discover170-artworks-stolen-by-nazis [https://perma.cc/3ADH-XE6M]; Barbie Latza Nadeau,
Museums Use ‘Nazi Tactics’ to Keep Art Stolen by the Nazis, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 29, 2018,
10:04 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/museums-use-nazi-tactics-to-keep-art-stolenby-the-nazis [https://perma.cc/C72N-7S9S]; Isabel Vincent, New York City Museums Are
Fighting to Keep Art Stolen by the Nazis, N.Y. POST (Nov. 24, 2018, 9:31 AM),
https://nypost.com/2018/11/24/new-york-city-museums-are-fighting-to-keep-art-stolen-bythe-nazis/ [https://perma.cc/T8VX-KZTG]; Kate Brown, Three Munich Museums Restitute
9 Nazi-Looted Artworks to the Heirs of Jewish Collectors, ARTNET NEWS (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/restitution-munich-museums-1616695 [https://perma.cc/
ZF9K-FW97]. See generally Erin L. Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural Gains: Ethical
Dilemmas in WWII-Looted Art Repatriation Claims Against Public Institutions, 33
HASTINGS COMMC’N. & ENT. L.J. 407 (2011) (examining the ethical dilemmas of looted Nazi
art and the ways in which these dilemmas will increasingly need to be addressed); Stephen
K. Urice, Elizabeth Taylor’s Van Gogh: An Alternative Route to Restitution of Holocaust
Art?, 22 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2011) (suggesting an approach to
restitution of looted art that would solve issues related to statutes of limitation).
75
Jonathan Jones, Why a Swiss Gallery Should Return Its Looted Nazi Art Out of Simple
Decency, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2016, 12:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign
/jonathanjonesblog/2016/jan/27/swiss-gallery-nazi-art-restitution-constable-painting-jaffe
[https://perma.cc/JHF8-9ZTD]; see also Heirs to Art Looted by Nazis Sue Swiss Bank for
Fraudulent Sales, HAARETZ (Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/hblocked?returnTo=
https%3A%2F%2Fwww.haaretz.com%2Fjewish%2Fheirs-sue-swiss-bank-over-art-sales1.5316813 [https://perma.cc/7GAW-6UXZ].
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Chaux-de-Fonds, insists on keeping the work but offered to display a plaque
explaining its provenance in the gallery.76
The Nazi Plunder emerged shortly after the Nazi party gained power in
Germany in 1933. It expanded in the following years and reached its peak during
the devastating period of World War II and the formation of the ghettos and
concentration camps. The term “Nazi Plunder” refers to the massive theft of art and
other significant cultural items stolen by the Nazi party as part of an organized
looting scheme across Europe. Working in tandem with the Nuremberg Laws, which
came into effect in 193577 and deprived Jews of their German citizenship, a new law
in Nazi Germany required Jews to register their domestic and foreign property and
assets. This was part of a general scheme to “Aryanize” all Jewish businesses.78 By
the end of 1938, approximately two-thirds of previously Jewish-owned businesses
were sold to Germans at a fixed price below their market value.79 This process
essentially expropriated all property that was owned by Jews.
The ongoing efforts to Aryanize all property continued with a decree, published
on October 3, 1938, ordering the confiscation of Jewish property and its transfer to
non-Jewish hands (i.e., German hands).80 The use of discriminatory legislation to
deprive Jews of their basic human rights continued until the final creation of the
ghettos, symbolizing the greatest deprivation of all. By the time that the Jewish
communities had been sequestered into the ghettos, the vast majority of Jewish

76

Id.; see also Lior Zemer & Anat Lior, Art and Copyright in Ghettos and
Concentration Camps: A Manifesto of Third-Generation Holocaust Survivors, 109 GEO. L.
J. 813 (2021) (including the discussion elsewhere in this Note the history of the massive art
theft by the Nazis).
77
Germany, Index of Jews Whose German Nationality Was Annulled by Nazi Regime,
1935–1944, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/2027/ [https://perma.
cc/F9CB-69U6] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021).
78
See Anti-Jewish Legislation in Prewar German, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL
MUSEUM,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/anti-jewishlegislation-in-prewar-germany [https://perma.cc/Z8XE-GM4H] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021);
See also HAROLD JAMES, THE DEUTSCHE BANK AND THE NAZI ECONOMIC WAR AGAINST
THE JEWS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF JEWISH-OWNED PROPERTY 47, 53–62 (2004); ROBBERY
AND RESTITUTION: THE CONFLICT OVER JEWISH PROPERTY IN EUROPE (Martin Dean,
Constantin Goschler & Philipp Ther eds., 2006); Hans-Christian Jasch, Civil Service
Lawyers and the Holocaust: The Case of Wilhelm Stuckart, in THE LAW IN NAZI GERMANY:
IDEOLOGY, OPPORTUNISM, AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE 49 (Alan E. Steinweis & Robert
D. Rachlin, eds., 2013); HAROLD JAMES, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP AND THE DEUTSCHE
BANK 63 (2004).
79
Id.
80
Antisemitic Legislation 1933–1939, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/antisemitic-legislation-19331939 [https://perma.cc/3NAW-L46F] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021); see also Confiscation of
Jewish Property in Europe, 1933–1945: New Sources and Perspectives, UNITED STATES
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 76 (2003), https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/
bib78563 [https://perma.cc/H9C5-5NGK].
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property had already been expropriated.81 Even though some looted items were
eventually recovered, many artworks are still missing today, more than seventy
years after the liberation of the ghettos and concentration camps. International
endeavors have been carried out for decades to identify unaccounted for items with
the purpose of returning them to their rightful owners or heirs. These efforts
included, inter alia: international conferences such as the Washington Conference;82
U.S. legislation, such as the “Holocaust Victims Redress Act”83 and the “Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016”;84 and international declarations, such as
the “Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era and Related Issues.”85 Research has
shown that the property of over nine million Jews in Europe was looted, confiscated,
or destroyed during and shortly after the Holocaust.86 Most looted property was
owned by individuals and families. It is estimated that no more than 20% of Jewish
properties (private and communal) have been restituted to their rightful owners since

81

See LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933–1945 99 (1985);
KARL A. SCHLEUNES, THE TWISTED ROAD TO AUSCHWITZ: NAZI POLICY TOWARD GERMAN
JEWS 1933–1939 (1990).
82
The Washington Conference produced a document titled “Principles on NaziConfiscated Art,” which is comprised of eleven non-binding principles that, inter alia,
expressly declare the importance of identifying such artwork and returning such works to
their rightful owners. See Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE ARCHIVE, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/23231.htm
[https://perma.cc/AC5L-24Y9] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021); see also Samantha Elie, Why Wait
So Long: The Cornelius Gurlitt Collection and the Need for Clear ADR Mechanisms in the
Restitution of Looted Art, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 363, 369 (2017); Jillian E.
Meaney, From Platitudes to the Passage of the HEAR Act: How Procedural Obstacles in
U.S. Courts Have Prevented the Restitution of Nazi-Expropriated Art and Congress’s Efforts
to Provide a Resolution, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 375 (2017).
83
See generally Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15
(1998) (stating that all governments should take measures to facilitate the return of private
and public property that was looted by the Nazis).
84
For more on this Act, see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 13 nn.72–73 (2017); Jason
Barnes, Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act of 2016: A Federal Reform to
State Statutes of Limitations for Art Restitution Claims, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 593,
603–05 (2018). See also Scott M. Caravello, The Role of the Doctrine of Laches in
Undermining the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, 106 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794–
95 (2020) (arguing that the doctrine of laches undermines the effectiveness of this Act and
thus must be precluded as an available defense); see generally Zuckerman v. Metro. Museum
of Art, 307 F. Supp. 3d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussing the laches defense in a restitution
claim under the Act).
85
Bureau of Eur. & Eurasian Aff., U.S. Dep’t of State, Prague Holocaust Era Assests
Conference: Terezin Declaration (June 30, 2009), https://wjro.org.il/our-work/internationaldeclarations-resolutions/terezin-declaration/ [https://perma.cc/XL3B-2UG7] (signed by 46
countries).
86
Zemer & Lior, supra note 76 (citing Shelly Mizrahi, Restitution Victims of the
Holocaust: Comparative Review, KNESSET RSCH. CTR., May 23, 2010, at 3 n.65, 4).
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the war ended.87 New Jewish communities that arose from the ashes in Europe
received only a small portion of the property that had belonged to their predecessors.
Legislation was enacted across Europe in an attempt to restitute Jewish property, but
the legislation was rarely enforced by local authorities.88
Since the end of the war, several cases have been brought to courts by victims
of Nazi looting, or their heirs, in an attempt to restitute looted property owned by
them or by their families.89 Even when a work of art is identified as a plundered
work, the current possessors are not eager to make efforts to return the item. For
example, in 2020, an art researcher was “disappointed that a German museum that
employed her did not seem serious about returning artworks with tainted
provenances.”90 This story revealed a deep disagreement concerning the obligations
of private art collectors to restitute looted artwork in their possession, as opposed to
the obligations of the German government when it possesses a looted artifact. The
foundation that hired the art researcher stated that “the German federal government
as the legal successor of the Third Reich is responsible for compensating for the
crimes of the Third Reich,” not private entities.91 This leads to much confusion and
legal uncertainty, and it diminishes the ability of the original owner to receive what
is rightfully theirs.
The legal challenge presented by looted art centers around property rights in
tangible and movable properties. Artworks that were stolen from Jewish families
during the war have serious aggregated monetary and financial implications.
However, this issue lacks the unique personal connection of an author to her work;
looted artworks cannot tell the authentic story of what happened within the ghettos
and concentration camps. Creating art, from portraits and diaries to musical and
theatrical works, provided an emotional haven to Jewish prisoners at their most
difficult time. These works provide unique dialogical platforms reflecting authentic
inhuman historical moments. Every year, over 14,000 Holocaust survivors die in
Israel alone.92 It is predicted that by 2025 in Israel, only 92,600 Holocaust survivors

87

Zemer & Lior, supra note 76 (citing Shelly Mizrahi, Restitution Victims of the
Holocaust: Comparative Review, KNESSET RSCH. CTR., May 23, 2010, at 3 n.66, 5).
88
See Laurence Weinbaum, Defrosting History: The Restitution of Jewish Property in
Eastern Europe, in THE PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST 83–108
(Avi Beker ed., 2001).
89
See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN
AMERICA’S COURTS 202–48 (2003).
90
Catherine Hickley, She Tracked Nazi-Looted Art. She Quit When No One Returned
It, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/arts/design/georgschafer-museum-nazi-looted-art.html [https://perma.cc/DD9U-M2P7].
91
Id.
92
Raf Sanchez, Tens of Thousands of Israeli Holocaust Survivors Are Living in Abject
Poverty, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/middleeast/israel/12122754/Tens-of-thousands-of-Israeli-Holocaust-survivors-areliving-in-abject-poverty.html [https://perma.cc/2GTH-6E59].
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will remain alive and that by 2035 that number will decrease to 26,200.93 These
artworks are invaluable as they will serve as the only remaining authentic message
Holocaust survivors and victims have to share with future generations. The next Part
demonstrates the dialogical value of these works.
III. AUTHENTIC DIALOGUES
A. Against Denial
Copyright works involve “duties to the public as well as rights in the work.”94
From this premise, we derive our analysis on how to reconcile the tension between
ownership rights of authors of ghetto art and the public interest. Artistic, musical,
literary, and dramatic works created within the ghettos and concentration camps
communicate authentic realities, desperate thoughts, personal ideals, and hopes.95
These works hold unparalleled dialogical value by virtue of being the penultimate
properties that communicate to the public the true story of this barbaric history. The
nature of these works as dialogical raises an unexplored and neglected moral tension
that this Article aims to reconcile—the tension between the original authors’
legitimate exclusive rights to own and control their creative expressions and the
public’s collective duty to preserve the authentic memories embedded in these
works. This duty can be delivered if the public retains a right to be exposed to the
works and communicate with their authentic message.
The societal need for free and open communicative spaces in modern times
raises questions about the legitimacy of attaching exclusive rights to creative and
ideational commodities.96 Copyright laws are a storehouse of principles and
doctrines that aim to provide protection to these spaces and make them available to

93

Lidar Grave-Lazi, Report: Only 26,200 Holocaust Survivors Will Be Living in Israel
by 2035, THE JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 24, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.jpost.com/israelnews/only-26200-holocaust-survivors-will-be-living-in-israel-by-2035-539668 [https://per
ma.cc/7S7R-ZPQ2]. It is important to note that the predictions might be grimmer due to the
impact of Covid-19. See, e.g., Israel: 900 Holocaust Survivors Died of Covid-19 in 2020,
AP NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-seniors-coronaviruspandemic-the-holocaust-ad5f95db83171731d71337002e839b6a [https://perma.cc/Y5SDJ9DY].
94
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward “For Limited Times,” 88 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 704 (2008) (reviewing LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT
(2007)).
95
See generally Zemer, supra note 64 (articulating an innovative approach to copyright
in which works of art are expressions of dialogical transactions).
96
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53 (1996) (asking why an author deserves a right if he or she
“is merely taking public goods—language, ideas, culture, humor, genre—and converting
them to his or her own use?”).
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as many members of society as possible. Doctrines such as fair use,97 the
idea/expression dichotomy,98 or the limited duration of copyright protection99
facilitate “uncompensated transfers”100 of social wealth, which effectuate and
expand broad, communicative, and dialogical opportunities by limiting the
preemptive enclosure of cultural properties. Works created within the ghettos,
concentration camps, and extermination camps provide genuine and authentic
dialogical spaces within which a solid and effective public discourse can form.
Exposure to these works feeds conversations of change.101 In these dialogical spaces,
the other—the user, listener, or viewer of the works—becomes part of the dialogical
event despite the absence of the original author. Martin Buber once wrote that “all
conversation derives its genuineness only from the consciousness of the element of
inclusion.”102 What defines a true dialogue is the fact that the other is integral to the
communicative act. In dialogues, parties “listen deeply,”103 understand each other,
97

See generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE – HOW
PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011) (discussing the use of copyright material,
especially use without permission or payment); RENÉE HOBBS, COPYRIGHT CLARITY HOW
FAIR USE SUPPORTS DIGITAL LEARNING (2010); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135–36 (1990); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.,
934 F.Supp.2d 640, 652–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (confronting a copyright dispute between artists
and a technology marketplace company); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1146, 1163–68 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering a copyright owner’s efforts to stop an internet
search engine from creating access to infringing images); Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014) (considering a television producer’s copyright infringement claim
against a subscription service that allows its users to watch broadcasts as they air). For more
on fair use, see Section IV.A.
98
Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 608
(1998); Marc K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Factual Works, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 263, 284 (2006); Leslie A.
Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221,
1222 (1993); Amaury Cruz, Comment, What’s the Big Idea Behind the Idea-Expression
Dichotomy?–Modern Ramifications of the Tree of Porphyry in Copyright Law, 18 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 221 (1990).
99
See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 991 (1997); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970);
Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1977); M. William Krasilovsky,
Observations on Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 205 (1967); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 366
(1996).
100
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982).
101
Patrick M. Jenlink, The Power of Dialogue in Social Systems, in DIALOGUE AS A
COLLECTIVE MEANS OF DESIGN CONVERSATION 51, 53 (Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H.
Banathy eds., 2008).
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MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 115 (Maurice Friedman ed., Ronald
Gregor-Smith trans., 1965).
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Id.
TO

2022]

INHUMAN COPYRIGHT SCENE

371

and create a community. For a communicative event on works created within the
ghettos and concentration camps to reach the level of a conversation of change,104 a
dialogue, a process of inclusion and exposure, must take place where the other, the
user, is allowed access to the works in order to form a dialogical union with the
authentic message of the given work. In most works of Holocaust art, the formation
of such a union is made unilaterally because the authors have been murdered.
Dialogue is a relational act—a relation “that we create and sustain by conjoint
agreement through shared discourse”105 and a mechanism for creating culture by
virtue of connecting one’s subjective individual consciousness with the
institutionalized structure of society, which allows cross-cultural communication
and learning. Dialogue, as a relational act, transforms the isolated being from an
autonomous to a communicative entity.106 The examples provided of works created
within the ghettos and concentration camps explain how the copyright scene within
these places rescued the subjective artist and author from their solitude, inviting
them to communicate through music, art, and theater. These communicative
attempts have yielded creative works, made either deliberately or under threat, that
project the communicative reality in which the authors created as well as the place
of the other in this reality.
As a social virtue that endows one with the strength to form part of a social
organization,107 dialogue requires a deeper understanding of mutuality and
interaction, and therefore, “[dialogue] reigns supreme in the imagination of many as
to what good communication might be.”108 Dialogue does not necessitate the
physical presence of the other: a person who creatively expresses himself is in a
constant dialogue with others—and the other is in a constant genuine discourse with
the artist’s original message. In creating artistic and authorial expressions,
participants in dialogue address and respond to a polyphony of voices. They do not
always know to whom and to how many they respond,109 but they reflect the outer
environment of the author or artist who is always engaged in an unlimited dialogue.
The reflection of outer experiences becomes more acute in Holocaust works of art
104

See Jenlink, supra note 101.
Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H. Banathy, Dialogue and Designing Our Future:
Conversation as Culture Creating and Consciousness Evolving, in DIALOGUE AS A
COLLECTIVE MEANS OF DESIGN CONVERSATION 51, 160 (Patrick M. Jenlink & Bela H.
Banathy eds., 2008).
106
DMITRI NIKULIN, ON DIALOGUE 141 (2006) (arguing that dialogue transforms “the
individual from a closed, self-sustaining, and isolated subject to a dialogical person.”).
107
Charles H. Cooley, The Process of Social Change, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 63, 69–70 (1897)
(providing that “[a] man is not so much strong in himself as formed to make part of a strong
whole” and instead requires good “communicated arts and actions” in his struggle for
existence).
108
JOHN DURHAM PETERS, SPEAKING INTO THE AIR: A HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF
COMMUNICATION 62 (1999).
109
See, e.g., JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS
DRIVING THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS (2008) (discussing how crowds can create knowledge
and respond to a multiplicity of voices, without having to personally know each and every
member of the crowd).
105

372

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

that were created in a reality where artists could not avoid addressing a polyphony
of desperate and devastating voices representing the authentic collective experience
in the ghettos.
The unique social nature of dialogue renders it an advanced form of
communication that defies closure and finality and perpetually serves as a “vehicle
for reformulating old elements into new patterns.”110 Copyrighted properties are
dialogical for exactly the same reasons. First, they are, as indicated, not solitary
activities but rather manifestations of the dialogical experiences of the writer,
musician, poet, author, or artist. Second, they are futuristic entities because they
preclude finality and closure by allowing users to take, quote, and share the creative
works and to develop parts of a given work into new creative expressions. In order
to genuinely dialogue with works created within the ghettos, the authentic works
must be made available to viewers and users. Withholding these works from public
access shutters the public’s right to learn from, be exposed to, and communicate with
the messages that those who died bequeathed to them. Withholding these works from
free public access disturbs their perpetual role as vehicles for change—an outcome
that may feed Holocaust denial. Therefore, copyright ownership of ghetto art ought
to be understood as involving “duties to the public as well as rights in the work.”111
If copyright law has a “communicative impact,”112 a dialogical importance in
society, and is the source for a variety of discursive activities, knowing the
original—or as close as possible to the original—message and meaning of authorial
works is imperative. This is not only an author-centered argument praising the
special connection between authors and their copyrightable “spiritual children.”113
This is a public right.114
In copyright, the system of moral rights provides protection to aspects of
cultural integrity. Governments have a duty to protect “national culture for its own
prestige, and for the benefit of the public.”115 Applying this to our argument, we do
not seek to legitimize enclosing copyright by virtue of providing further rights to
authors, but rather we propose to consider misattribution, manipulation, and
distortion of information as a public wrong. The dialogical importance of
copyrightable spaces requires the law to ensure that the moral integrity and message
of certain works cannot be altered. This assumption is relevant to both sides of the
argument: it protects users from being barred from accessing the works, but at the
110

C. Jan Swearingen, Dialogue and Dialectic: The Logic of Conversation and the
Interpretation of Logic, in THE INTERPRETATION OF DIALOGUE 47 (Tulio Maranhão ed.,
1990).
111
Kwall, supra note 94, at 704.
112
LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 61 (2007).
113
See infra Section VI.B.
114
Shifting the focus from authors to the benefit for society in general can also be found
in the rhetoric preferred by the new trademark-style consumer protectionists. See, e.g., Greg
Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1175–76 (2005).
115
Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights in the Public Domain: Copyright Matters in
the Works of Indian Poet C. Subramania Bharati, 2001 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 161, 181
(2001).
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same time, protects certain authors’ works from being subjected to creative
mutilation or changes of the inherent meaning and message. True, there are
“[c]ertain things” that, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bilski v. Kappos, must
remain “free for all to use.”116 However, this freedom cannot always alter authentic
authorial and artists’ messages. Copyright is a democracy-enhancing mechanism117
that requires the system to maintain its objective of being “the engine of free
expression,”118 notwithstanding the allocation of rights, both moral and material, to
authors.
Copyright law controls what the public can and cannot do with protected works.
These types of control regimes affect our ability “to transform ourselves and our
environment.”119 The property rights vested in works created in communicative and
dialogical spaces are statutorily granted to the control of the author.120 However,
copyright protection must be mitigated by and balanced against the exclusive
normative value that rightfully belongs to works created under such extreme
circumstances as those characterizing life in the ghettos and concentration camps
during the Holocaust. These works are the only remaining testimonies of the six
million Jews murdered. We argue that the authenticity of the works makes them a
closed category of works that deserves to remain unamenable, unaltered, and
unchangeable. Copyright law lacks any such exclusion for works created in extreme
circumstances.
Allowing access to authentic messages from authors who created work in the
ghettos would serve to progress fundamental dialogues on the Holocaust—dialogues
that confront the fatal wrongs embedded in any version of Holocaust denial. Several
countries have enacted laws criminalizing the denial of the authentic history of
ghettos and concentration camps, the genocide of the Jewish people, and the means
by which the Nazis achieved their goal.121 Copyrighted works created during the
116

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 622 (2010), referring to Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
117
See generally NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008).
118
Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
119
MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 104 (2010).
120
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/ [https://perma.cc/YP3S-3EZV] (last visited Sept.
21, 2021) (stating that the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
gives “creators such as authors, musicians, poets, painters, etc. with the means to control how
their works are used, by whom, and on what terms”).
121
See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, EU Adopts Measure Outlawing Holocaust Denial, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 19, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/19/world/europe/19ihteu.4.5359640.html [https://perma.cc/3U6B-RPBB]; Joe Mulhall, Holocaust Denial Is
Changing – The Fight Against It Must Change Too, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2018, 11:33 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/21/holocaust-denial-changing-anti
semitism-far-right [https://perma.cc/YAA7-VGUD]; Ben Collins, George Brandis:
Holocaust Denial Would Not Become Legal Under My New Laws, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL.
(Mar. 26, 2014, 11:48 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/george-brandis-holocaustdenial-would-not-become-legal-under-my-new-laws-2014-3
[https://perma.cc/LX35-
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Holocaust authentically document this history. Withholding or changing their
inherent communicative effect, message, and meaning amounts to a creative denial
of these works and their fundamental value to society. The act of withholding these
works from the public and storing them in archives in effect obstructs their dialogical
potential and communicative importance. Changing them softens and disrupts their
message and interferes with their unique meaning.122
B. Three Levels of Dialogue
Martin Buber distinguishes between three different levels of dialogue.123 First,
there exists genuine dialogue.124 This rare level occurs when “each of the
participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being
and turns to them with the intention of establishing living mutual relations between
himself and them.”125 The second level is technical dialogue, which occurs when
F6Q4]; Tom McIlroy, Racial Discrimination Act Changes Would Allow Holocaust Denial,
Says Shane Rattenbury, AGE (May 5, 2014, 2:01 PM), https://www.theage.com.au/national
/act/racial-discrimination-act-changes-would-allow-holocaust-denial-says-shane-rattenbury
-20140505-zr4vk.html [https://perma.cc/5CEV-8CB7]; Holocaust Denier Fredrick Toben
Jailed
in
Australia,
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
14,
2009,
7:00
AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/6025275/Hol
ocaust-denier-Fredrick-Toben-jailed-in-Australia.html
[https://perma.cc/878M-23G9];
Chris Baynes, More than 2.6m Brits Are Holocaust Deniers, Poll Finds, INDEP. (Jan. 27,
2019, 1:20 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/holocaust-memorialday-poll-uk-jews-murdered-nazi-germany-hope-not-hate-a8746741.html [https://perma.cc/
GPH7-CT8K]; Ian Traynor, Holocaust Denier Jailed, GUARDIAN WKLY.,
https://www.theguardian.com/guardianweekly/story/0,,1715580,00.html [https://perma.cc/
92Q5-E463] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); Jeremy Sharon, ‘Landmark Decision’ in UK
Upholds Conviction for Holocaust Denial, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 13, 2019, 7:14 PM),
https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Landmark-decision-in-UK-upholds-conviction-for-Holo
caust-denial-580589 [https://perma.cc/Z54L-3H6G]. On July 1986 Israel passed a law
criminalizing Holocaust denial: Denial of Holocaust (Prohibition) Law, 5746-1986.
122
See, e.g., Hunters: Jewish Groups Criticise Holocaust Portrayal in Amazon Show,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51606389
[https://perma.cc/35DR-DVXU] (stating that changing works that were created during the
Holocaust portrays an unauthentic and “fictitious depiction[] of the Holocaust”); see also
Clare Duffy, Amazon Facing Criticism from Holocaust Remembrance Groups over Books,
Prime TV Show, CNN BUS. (Feb. 24, 2020, 12:56 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/23
/business/amazon-holocaust-criticism/index.html [https://perma.cc/4YHV-GACD].
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Vaida Asakavičiūtė & Vytis Valtka, Martin Buber’s Dialogical Communication:
Life as an Existentialf Dialogue, 31 Filosofija Sociologija 51, 55 (2020).
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Id.
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BUBER, supra note 102, at 22. This relates to one of the basic elements in Buber’s
conception of dialogue: confirmation. An awareness of the other as unique and whole
necessitate turning to the other in the sense of confirming the other. Buber writes: “In human
society at all its levels, persons confirm one another in a practical way to some extent or
other in their personal qualities and capacities, and a society may be termed human in the
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people reciprocate in understanding each other, such as dialogue between coworkers
or strangers seeking directions.126 Such dialogues are low-level, verbal exchanges.127
The third level is a monologue disguised as a dialogue.128 This level includes “a
conversation in which someone seeks only to make a particular impression on the
other.”129 A monologue under these terms is a solitary and exclusionary experience
in the sense that “the focus is more on the self than on one’s partner.”130
Although the first level of dialogue can occur surprisingly in “all kinds of odd
corners[,]” it is, Buber writes, a rare occasion.131 We argue that a genuine dialogue
in the realm of copyrighted commodities is not as rare as it may be in other social
realms. A genuine dialogue, defined according to the first level, is fundamental to
creative expressions in which one’s cultural and social experiences are combined
with one’s monological properties. Every copyrighted enterprise establishes “a
living mutual relation” between the author or artist and others.132 Because “the life
of dialogue is the turning towards the other,”133 and because authorial and artistic
works require dialogical resources to emerge, formalize, and generate meaning to be
understood by the audience, a monological view of copyright that overemphasizes
the authorial self by treating authors as the main source of their creative expressions
thereby strengthening authors’ exclusive rights in their works is socially and legally
wrong. Dina Gottliebova’s eleven portraits, Felix Nussbaum’s self-portrait, as well
as playwright Jura Soyfer and composer Herbert Zipper’s ‘Dachau Song’ are
dialogical. They required the other for their creative expression. These works are
expressions of the first level of dialogue and, as such, authentically project the
horrific reality of the ghettos to which the creators’ fellow inmates contributed by
virtue of supplying the surroundings, the suffering, the faces, the lack of basic human
traits—the properties of these works.
An individualistic approach to copyright hinders the interhuman life of creative
dialogues by virtue of providing authors exclusive rights to control their creative
measure to which its members confirm one another.” MARTIN BUBER, THE KNOWLEDGE OF
MAN: SELECTED ESSAYS 67 (Maurice Friedman ed., Maurice Friedman & Ronald Gregor
Smith trans., 1965).
126
See Asakavičiūtė & Valtka, supra note 123, at 55–56.
127
See id.
128
See id. at 56.
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130
Id.
131
BUBER, supra note 102, at 22.
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Id.
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Id. at 25. Turning towards the other has a temporal dimension as well. Buber referred
specifically to “genuine dialogical moments.” Martin Buber, Replies to My Critics, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN BUBER 689, 692 (Paul Arthur Schilpp & Maurice Friedman eds.,
1967). Cissna and Anderson explain a dialogic moment as “the experience of inventive
surprise shared by the dialogic partners as each ‘turns toward’ the other and both mutually
perceive the impact of each other’s turning. It is a brief interlude of focused awareness and
acceptance of otherness . . . .” Kenneth N. Cissna & Rob Anderson, Theorizing About
Dialogic Moments: The Buber-Rogers Position and Postmodern Themes, 8 COMMC’N
THEORY 63, 74 (1998).
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expressions, ignoring the role of the other in the creative process, and imposing on
the public only limited access rights that in turn restrict the fundamental interhuman
relations necessary for the creative process. For example, the term of protection in
copyright law favors policies of exclusion.134 It limits the evolution of creative
development by enclosing the storehouse of cultural resources135 and imposing on
others a duty to comply with the rules of exclusion. In the Statute of Anne 1710,
known as the first modern copyright law, the initial term of protection was fourteen
years.136 The statute recognized a right of reversion should an author live after the
expiration date of the copyright.137 The term could be renewed for another period of
fourteen years if merited by social or economic circumstances.138 In the 1710 Act,
the author and the interhuman aspect of creativity together were part of the legal
bargain. Bentley and Ginsburg explain, “the second fourteen years should have
enabled the author to grant rights anew from a stronger bargaining position should
her work have earned a substantial audience.”139 Acquiring an audience substantial
enough to secure an additional term required wide dissemination of the work and,
consequently, the recognition of the other—the audience—as the social target for
the work’s communicative future. That recognition is possible only in the realm of
the interhuman.
Genuine dialogue requires seeing the other qua other, that is, as he wishes to be
seen and treated. Copyright law protects this principle, too, through the set of moral
rights that preserve the integrity of an author’s creative text, both its “meaning and
message.”140 The private and social dimensions of moral rights explain their
fundamentality to genuine dialogical experiences. From an individualistic
perspective, a lack of protection may “strip the author of an important aspect of her
persona, and might also garble or diminish the author’s attempt to communicate the
nature of her culture to the audience.”141 As discussed earlier in this Part, moral
134

See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998). The Act was challenged in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193–194 (2003)
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Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 197 (2002) (discussing the extension of
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136
Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, § 2 (Gr. Brit.).
137
Id. §§ 1, 9.
138
Id. § 11.
139
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Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1479 (2010).
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Failure, 88 B.U. L. REV. 709, 715–16 (2008); see also Edward J. Damich, The Right of
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rights give authors the ability to be treated as they wish, restricting the ways in which
the public can use or manipulate the authors’ creative works. One can license his
copyright, but not the moral rights attached to the protected work. Moral rights are
manifestations of one’s personality in one’s intellectual expressions. They act as
barriers to expropriation of inalienable features of one’s personality, embedded in
one’s artistic creations. The right of integrity, for example, gives an author the
exclusive right to project his “soul of creativity.”142 The relationship between the
work and the author is so strong that, as Kwall writes, it resembles that between “a
parent and a child.”143 From a social perspective, moral rights act as guardians of
accurate information, as they give the author a “right to inform the public about the
original nature of the artistic message and the meaning of her work.”144 Furthermore,
because copyrighted works are products of the creative collectivity, the public, and
its creative members, which together hold the various roles of the other, retain a
legitimate right to communicate with the author qua author and to access the new
resource created with the public’s contribution.
Moral rights ensure that every use of a work acknowledges the author in his
uniqueness and wholeness. The doctrine of moral rights requires an attitude that
“encourages turning towards the other, imagining the reality of the other, receiving
the other as partner, and hence confirming the other as a person.”145 Moral rights
unfold the other in ways that conform with Buber’s ideal dialogue. This supports an
argument that moral rights are better candidates for stronger protection than
economic rights because they better foster genuine dialogue premised on accurate
information and the building of new dialogical paths. Moral rights, then, ensure that
the author, in his capacity as the other, receives protection for his expression and
that the public receives accurate information based on the real message and meaning
intended by the author in his expressive commodity. Although moral rights create
some barriers to free dialogue,146 they feed the ground on which public dialogue can
receive and benefit from the author’s genuine message.
One may wrongly assume that Martin Buber, with his ideal approach to
dialogism, was simply trying to convince us to live a harmonious life of dialogue
and inclusion. But, according to Lothstein, what Buber attempted to do was remind
us of the “right to community that deserves our philosophical attention”147 by
crafting a philosophical anthropology depicting the human experience as a
continuum of struggle. It is neither monological nor dialogical but a continuous
management of the tension between these two polarities, which allows people to
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA.
L. REV. 1 (1988).
142
KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, supra note 140, at 6.
143
Id. at xiv.
144
Id. at 151 (emphasis added); see also Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1519, 1564 (2011).
145
Cissna & Anderson, supra note 133, at 65.
146
See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263 (2009).
147
Arthur S. Lothstein, To Be Is to Be Relational: Martin Buber and John Dewey, in
MARTIN BUBER AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 33, 48 (Maurice Friedman ed., 1996).
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seek both unity and individuation.148 Unity in copyright requires a strong public
domain and recognition of the role of the collective in the creative process.
Individuation in copyright is manifested in the rewards authors obtain for the labor
and personality they invest in a given work. The copyright-making process is an
ongoing process premised on mutuality in every act of creation. Indeed, if mutuality
can happen, as Buber maintains, in an underground air-raid shelter or between two
audience members listening to Mozart in a darkened opera house,149 then mutuality
between creators and others in the process of creating texts and art is unquestionable.
Martin Buber’s first level of dialogue refers to rare and infrequent occurrences when
“each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present . . .
and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relations . . . .”150
Intellectual properties are dialogical manifestations of interhuman experiences.
Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue invites us to rethink the interpersonal
dimension of the creative process.151 It restores the notion of “we” and its place in
this process.152 This “we” notion was integral to the creation of Holocaust works of
art. The strong reciprocal connection between the author and the other surrounding
him or her stands at the center of the creation of these works in an attempt to
commemorate, preserve, and immortalize the dialogue between the authors and
others and the unspoken meaning behind the works.
IV. UNSATISFACTORY DOCTRINAL REMEDIES
A. Fair Use
Contemporary copyright doctrines, such as fair use and orphan works, aim at
freeing copyrighted materials from the confinements of property rules. These
doctrines impact the property entitlement of ghetto art and may seem strong enough
to reconcile the balance we examine. However, as we observe in this Part, these
doctrines are unsatisfactory as full remedies for that purpose. The fair use doctrine
enables the public to use protected artworks for restricted use, without obtaining the
author’s authorization. Common uses that fall within this doctrine’s umbrella are
educational purposes and parody.153 At its crux, this doctrine attempts to reach a
desired balance between the public’s need to gain access to protected works (and
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sometimes even change them) and the personal interests of the author.154 The
doctrine follows four proportionality tests in deciding if a certain use is permitted.
These tests evaluate the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the effect
of the use upon the potential market.155
Unlike the fair use doctrine, the fair dealing approach, common in other Anglocountries, is much less flexible. In the UK, for example, the Copyright, Designs, and
Patents Act of 1988 (CDPA) sets specific circumstances under which fair dealings
are allowed and where their use does not amount to copyright infringement. The
uses are limited to non-commercial research and private study, criticism, review,
quotation, and news reports.156 Other permitted activities include parody, caricature,
pastiche,157 and illustration for teaching. The UK Intellectual Property Office
published guidelines that include key elements identified by the court as relevant to
determine the validity of fair dealing in a particular work. These elements question
whether “using the work affect[s] the market for the original work[.] If a use of a
work acts as a substitute for it, causing the owner to lose revenue, then it is not likely
to be fair[.]”158 The elements also ask whether “the amount of the work taken [was]
reasonable and appropriate . . . [and whether] it [was] necessary to use the amount
that was taken[.] Usually, only part of a work may be used.”159 While the fair use
doctrine in the U.S. allows a wider recognition of unpaid legitimate uses, the
requirement presented by the British Intellectual Property Office, namely the
demand that no more than a reasonable amount will be taken from the original work,
presents a significant hurdle when applied to Holocaust art. Given their social and
dialogical value, ghetto artworks need to be presented in full and as is. Allowing
their use only if “a reasonable and appropriate” amount was taken from them
interferes with the very idea of freeing these works to the public.
B. Orphan Works
The orphan works doctrine refers to artworks for which an owner or heir is
impossible to locate or find. This doctrine applies in many countries around the

154
See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1659, 1687–89 (1988); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fair Use as Resistance, 9 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 377, 378 (2019); Lauren Gorab, Note, A Fair Use to Remember: Restoring
Application of the Fair Use Doctrine to Strengthen Copyright Law and Disarm Abusive
Copyright Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 705 (2018).
155
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
156
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 29, 30, 178.
157
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30A.
158
Exceptions to Copyright, UK INTELL. PROP. OFF. (Jan. 4, 2021),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-to-copyright#fair-dealing [https://perma.cc/WW
M9-8FZY].
159
Id.
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world, including Canada and Israel,160 but as of now, it has yet to be adopted in the
US.161 In the UK, this body of works is protected by an amendment to the CDPA
that allows individuals to use orphan works once the prospective user conducts a
diligent search and finds no owner.162 In these cases, the Secretary of State will grant
non-exclusive licenses. This licensing program is intended to operate in cooperation
with the exceptions stated in the EU Directive, which were implemented into UK
law.163 This amendment enables the UK Intellectual Property Office to grant a wider
exception to copyright protection, even for circumstances that do not fall within the
EU Directive, such as commercial use by a nonprofit organization.164 These
regulations governing the terms and issuance of individual orphan works licenses
were implemented in 2014.165 The UK Intellectual Property Office has published
industry-specific guidelines for prospective subject matter users conducting due
diligence research.166 Once a user has demonstrated the work’s lack of ownership,
the Intellectual Property Office may issue a non-exclusive license to use the work
within the UK for up to seven years, with the opportunity to renew the license at the

160
For Canada, see Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77. For Israel, see Copyright
Law (Amendment No. 5). Zemer & Lior, supra note 76, at 854 (citing Copyright Law
(Amendment No. 5), 5779–2019, SH No. 2777 p. 187 (Isr.)). “This amendment refers to
orphan works as ‘artworks for which the owner of the copyright is unknown or unlocated.’”
Id. at 854, n.280. “The law states that the usage of such artworks is permitted if (a) due
diligence was taken in order to locate the rightful owner(s) prior to usage; (b) the user
explicitly mentions that the usage of the artwork is carried out according to the exception
stated in the law and that the rightful owner is entitled to demand the user will cease the
usage of the artwork; (c) the user will cease the usage upon being notified by the rightful
owner.” Id. at 854–55, n.280. “Furthermore, if the use is commercial, in addition to the above
terms, the user must publish a message online or in a daily newspaper stating their obligation
to pay the rightful owner of the artwork any applicable royalties if that owner is ever
discovered.” Id. at 855, n.280.
161
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2015), https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphanworks2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9SC-XTJ4] (discussing the orphan works doctrine at
length to make a recommendation that the United States adopt orphan works legislation); see
also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS (2006), https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8ACL-4KXH].
162
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24, § 77.
163
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works)
Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2861.
164
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 161,
at 28–29.
165
Copyright and Rights in Performances (Licensing of Orphan Works) Regulations
2014, SI 2014/2863.
166
See Orphan Works Diligent Search Guidance for Applicants, U.K. INTELL. PROP.
OFF. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/orphan-works-diligentsearch-guidance-for-applicants [https://perma.cc/VE68-ADUU].
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end of the term.167 The license fees accrued are directed towards funding social,
cultural, and educational activities in the case that no right-holder makes a claim for
the fees within the time that the license is in effect.168 The vast majority of creative
works created within the ghettos are orphan works due to the devastating
circumstances of the Holocaust; due diligence research for such works would lead
to a name on the list of Jews murdered, in the best-case scenario, and in most cases
to no name at all. Thus, the stringent orphan works legislation that exists in the UK,
and the unique circumstances of Holocaust art, render this doctrine also
unsatisfactory and insufficient to liberate these works and provide the public with
access.
C. Resale Right
Another possible remedy is the resale right. Directive 2001/84/EC of the
European Parliament and European Council on the resale right for the benefit of the
author of an original work of art creates a right in favor of authors to receive royalties
even if their works are resold.169 This right is also known as droit de suite.170
Although this right appeared in the Berne Convention,171 not all Member States
applied the resale right in their territories. Because some took advantage of this fact
by selling works of art to countries that did not apply droit de suite, the Directive
was legislated.172 The Directive states that “Member States shall provide, for the
benefit of the author of an original work of art, a resale right, to be defined as an
inalienable right, which cannot be waived, even in advance, to receive a royalty
based on the sale price obtained for any resale of the work, subsequent to the first
transfer of the work by the author.”173 This right applies to original works of art
defined as “works of graphic or plastic art such as pictures, collages, paintings,
drawings, engravings, prints, lithographs, sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware
167

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 161,

at 29.

168

Id.
See Directive 2001/84, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2011 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of
Art, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32; Catherine Jewell, The Artist’s Resale Right: A Fair Deal for Visual
Artists, WIPO MAG, https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/03/article_0001.html
[https://perma.cc/KZ65-KTPC] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
170
The French version of Directive 2001/84/EC refers to the resale right as “droit de
suite.”
171
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 14ter, Sept.
26, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9927 (1986).
172
For a review of this right around the world, see Resale Right: Artists All Over the
World, https://www.resale-right.org/ [https://perma.cc/U743-SLZU] (last visited Sept. 15,
2021).
173
Directive 2001/84, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2011 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 O.J.
(L 272) 32, art. 1, § 1.
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and photographs, provided they are made by the artist himself or are copies
considered to be original works of art.”174 This makes the right relevant to certain
works only and excludes works such as literature and music. Furthermore, this right
applies to “all acts of resale involving as sellers, buyers or intermediaries’ art market
professionals, such as salesrooms, art galleries and, in general, any dealers in works
of art.”175 This is extremely important in the context of Holocaust artworks, given
that in many cases, these works have ended up at private art galleries, museums, and
other ‘intermediaries art market professionals.’ However, this right does not apply
to sales between private individuals and public museums,176 which leaves many
Holocaust artworks unprotected. Also, the Directive states that member states that
did not apply this right in the past can limit its application to artworks of living artists
until January 1, 2010,177 which renders this doctrine unsatisfactory to protect
Holocaust artworks.
In the US, Congress has considered implementing a droit de suite right but has
failed to do so thus far.178 In 2018, the American Royalties Too (ART) Act was
proposed.179 Although it has been introduced to Congress several times in the past,
it has not been signed into law.180 This Act offers to amend Title 17 of the United
States Code to provide a “small measure of equity”181 for artists, which is a lesser
degree of protection than that which the European scheme offers. Although the
resale right offers some relief to artists when their art has been resold in Europe as
well as other countries,182 it does not provide much remedy in the context of works
created within the ghettos or concentration camps. This is true because the largest
art market in the world—the US—does not apply this right. Many Holocaust
artworks ended up in private American institutions, but the resale right cannot
protect the authors. Furthermore, this right cannot help artists from whom art was
174

Id. art. 2, § 1.
Id. art. 1, § 2.
176
Id. pmbl. § 18 (“This right should not extend to acts of resale by persons acting in
their private capacity to museums which are not for profit and which are open to the public.”).
177
Id. art. 8, § 2.
178
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS
2–3 (December 2013) (“The Copyright Office agrees that these factors place many visual
artists at a material disadvantage vis-à-vis other authors, and therefore the Office supports
congressional consideration of a resale royalty right, or droit de suite . . . .”).
179
American Royalties Too Act, H.R. 6868 115th Cong. (2018).
180
Laurel Wickersham Salisbury, It’s Not that Easy: Artist Resale Royalty Rights and
the ART Act, CTR. FOR ART L. (July 1, 2019), https://itsartlaw.org/2019/07/01/its-not-thateasy-artist-resale-royalty-rights-and-the-art-act/ [https://perma.cc/KB5C-CA6F].
181
Maxwell L. Anderson, Why American Artists Should Benefit from the Resale of
Their Works, ART NEWSPAPER (Jan. 4, 2019, 12:02 PM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com
/comment/why-american-artists-should-benefit-from-the-resale-of-their-works [https://per
ma.cc/2XU4-U5CP].
182
See What Is the Artist’s Resale Right, RESALE RIGHT, https://resale-right.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/SG14-0464_Resale_right_2014-05-15_EN-3.pdf. [https://perma.
cc/VDF5-ZH8D] (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (listing over seventy countries that had
implemented this right as of 2014).
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acquired by public museums, which also represents a significant share of Holocaust
artworks. Therefore, despite the theoretical and practical importance of the droit de
suite right, it is another unsatisfactory remedy.
V. GHETTO ART AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. A Neglected Conceptual Advantage
Finding a normative argument, within contemporary copyright law, for
rescuing copyrighted works created within the ghettos and concentration camps is
almost inconceivable given the bare structure of these laws and their lack of the basic
legal and interpretive sensitivity necessary for this goal. If any such argument is to
be found, it must involve a strong public interest defense that offers protection to
both public and individual rights.183 In the following parts, we offer an innovative,
thorough, and extensive analysis of the public interest as it appears in copyright laws,
international treaties, or as directly and indirectly applied in the judicial
jurisprudence of certain countries. We argue that a strong public interest defense
would allow the general public and its individual members to uphold their duty to
remember, authentically communicate with, and absorb the historical lessons from
these works.
“The public interest that copyright law is designed to promote is the wide
availability of creative works.”184 The concept of “public interest” is enshrined
within contemporary copyright discourse.185 The power of rightsholders to control
the use of and access to copyrighted materials interferes with and challenges the way
the public interest is treated in practice. One of the initial aims of intellectual
property laws was to protect public, social, and cultural wealth in conjunction with
authors’ and inventors’ ability to ensure their works and inventions are not infringed
upon or exploited against their will and consent.186 That copyright law is inherently
sensitive to the public interest187 can be seen from the intrinsic structure and features
183

See, e.g., Amy Adler & Jeanne C. Fromera, Taking Intellectual Property into Their
Own Hands, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1455 (2019); Neil W. Netanel & David Nimmer, Is
Copyright Property?––The Debate in Jewish Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 241
(2011); Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 613 (2014).
184
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 240 F.3d 116, 124 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001).
185
See, e.g., ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE
DIGITAL IMPACT 80 (2005); ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1–4 (2010); ELENA COOPER, ART AND MODERN
COPYRIGHT: THE CONTESTED IMAGE 204 (2018).
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See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011).
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See Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law in Response to
Technological Change: Lessons from Europe About Fair Use and Free Expression, 30 U.
LA VERNE L. REV. 312, 317 (2009); Anthony Mason, Public-Interest Objectives and the Law
of Copyright, 9 J. L. & INFO. SCI. 7 (1998); ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010); GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2002).
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of copyright law, such as the main objective behind fair use,188 the distinction
between ideas and expressions,189 and the limited duration of the rights.190
Scholars recognize the public interest as an organizing principle within
copyright law. Patry argued that “in all copyright systems, furthering the interest of
the public is said to be an important goal . . . . In order to further any type of interest,
you have to identify it, study its characteristics, and then figure out empirically how
to ensure it thrives.”191 Dworkin provided that “copyright and the public interest are
inextricably linked. All copyright systems seek to strike a balance between the rights
of the copyright owner and the public interest.”192 Patterson noted that “the principle
that copyright exists primarily to serve the public interest remains a crucial
protection against any use of copyright to monopolize the market place of ideas.”193
Tushnet remarked that “the concept of public interest in intellectual property theory
generally seems to mean a thumb on the scales against private control in certain
arguments about good policy, as well as concern for distribution and not just for
maximizing utility.”194 Copinger and Skone James reiterated the balance that
copyright law must strike between rightsholders and the general public:
[I]t is considered a social requirement in the public interest that authors
and other rights owners should be encouraged to publish their work so as
to permit the widest possible dissemination of works to the public at large
. . . . The protection of copyright, along with other intellectual property
rights, is considered as a form of property worthy of special protection
because it is seen as benefiting society as a whole and stimulating further
creative activity and competition in the public interest.195
188

See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 97.
Dale P. Olson, The Uneasy Legacy of Baker v. Selden, 43 S.D. L. REV. 604, 608
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WEATHERALL & REBECCA GIBLIN, WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 3 (2017).
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INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 153, 154 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersane eds., 2005).
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194
Rebecca Tushnet, Intellectual Property as a Public Interest Mechanism, in THE
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The copyright laws of most countries do not offer a direct “public interest”
defense as part of their statutory commitments to allow public access to and
permitted uses of copyrighted works. The UK and New Zealand are unique examples
to the contrary.196 In the US, courts have referred to the “public interest” along with
First Amendment rights and the fair use doctrine in order to justify limits on
copyright and reject claims for infringements.197 As Balganesh remarked, “courts
have sought to introduce an element of ‘public interest’ clearly not expressly
mandated under the traditionally understood requirements of fair use.”198 For
example, in Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House,199 although the court decided
to apply the fair use doctrine, it added that the public interest also preferred the
dissemination of the copyright-protected information given the fact that it concerned
an important individual. In New York Times v. Roxbury Data Interface,200 the court
allowed the publication of certain names from an index created by the plaintiff
because that index would “serve the public interest in the dissemination of
information.”201
In the famous case of Times, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,202 the court
utilized the public interest to allow the use of the Kennedy assassination video
because “there was a public interest in having the fullest information available on
the murder of President Kennedy.”203 In Shady Records, the court stated that “[E]ven
while imputing bad faith to the Source Parties, [a court] may nonetheless conclude
that this is outweighed in the final analysis by the importance of the dissemination

196

See Section V.B below. For more on New Zealand, see infra note 249.
See Haochen Sun, Copyright Law as an Engine of Public Interest Protection, 16
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123 (2019); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Free
Expression: Analyzing the Convergence of Conflicting Normative Frameworks, 4 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 68–69 (2004).
198
Balganesh, supra note 197, at 68–9; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright
as Legal Process: The Transformation of American Copyright Law, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1101,
1117 (2020).
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Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
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New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
1977).
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Id. at 221.
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Times, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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about Muhammed Ali, see Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. 935 F. Supp. 490, (1996) (holding that the use in a television biography about
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of the recordings to the public.”204 In Peteski Productions, the court noted that “[I]t
is possible that a breach of contract or some other act of bad faith may sometimes
be necessary to further an important public interest and therefore such conduct might
not always weigh against fair use.”205 In Meeropol, while evaluating the factors
incorporated in the doctrine of fair use, the court remarked that “an extremely
important consideration is the public interest served by the use of the copied
materials and by the copying work itself.”206 And in the Cariou case, the court
recognized “the inherent public interest and cultural value of public exhibition of art
and of an overall increase in public access to artwork.”207 Other cases further
emphasized the important role of the public interest in evaluating whether to allow
uses of copyright-protected works, even if such uses fell short of the scope of fair
use.208 All these cases directly reference the public interest and its role within the
copyright system. However, in their decisions, courts mainly relied on legislated
doctrines, such as fair use, when ruling in favor of defendants advocating for the
protection of the public interest. The “public interest” principle has not reached the
level of a normative stand-alone defense, but rather subsists as a vital supporting
principle of copyright values.209 In common law countries, such as Australia and
204

Shady Records, Inc. v. Source Enterprises, Inc., No. 03 CIV. 9944, 2005 WL 14920,
at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005).
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materials of significant public interest.”).
206
Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y 1976).
207
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208
See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[C]ourts are more
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that benefits the wider public interest.”) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Lindberg v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 133 Wash. 2d 729, 744
(1997) (“[T]he public benefit resulting from the particular use of copyrighted work need not
necessarily be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a public
interest.”); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.1992), as amended
(Jan. 6, 1993); Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining that, when
determining whether use of copyrighted work is fair use, “courts must balance the statutory
factors to determine whether the public interest in the free flow of information outweighs the
copyright holder’s interest in exclusive control over the work”) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D
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Canada, the public interest appears in copyright legislation but not as an enforceable
independent defense against infringement claims.210 Despite this, the notion of the
public interest has made its way into judicial rulings where it has been referred to as
a common law protection, independent of statutes. Australia has narrowly
interpreted the notion of public interest or plainly rejected it.211 In the Defence Paper
case,212 a narrow public interest defense was accepted; subsequent cases have
doubted the existence of this defense.213 In Collier,214 Judge Gummow stated that
“in my view, there is no legislative or other warrant for the introduction of such a
concept into the law of this country.”215 On appeal, the Full Federal Court avoided
expressing its view on the public interest as an independent defense.216 Canada does
have a general public interest defense.217 The importance of the public interest as a
defining property of the Copyright Act was emphasized in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art
du Petit Champlain Inc.218 In this case, the court provided that the Copyright Act is
“a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the
creator[.]”219 Therefore, “[t]he evaluation of whether the dealing is ‘fair’ must be
considered with this balance in mind.”220 In 2001, Canada added a public interest
doctrine.”); Janice E. Oakes, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public
Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135, 160 (1984) (rejecting the usage of public interest in
evaluating fair use and concluding that “taken together, the idea-expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine can adequately protect first amendment interests. The public interest in
the dissemination of the appropriated material should not be an independent factor in the fair
use analysis. Undue emphasis on the public’s short-term interest in access at the expense of
the author’s copyright monopoly will only discourage authors from producing these same
works of ‘significant public interest’ and thereby defeat the very purpose of copyright.”).
210
See Cheng Lim Saw, Is There a Defense of Public Interest in the Law of Copyright
in Singapore?, 2003 SINGAPORE J. LEGAL STUD. 519, 537–538 (2007).
211
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DOMAINS 242–43 (2018).
212
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213
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214
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ULLRICH 379, 392 (Laurence Boy, Josef Drexel, Christine Godt, Reto Hilty & Bernard
Remiche, eds., 2009).
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defense as part of its reform to its Security of Information Act.221 However, the scope
of this defense is limited, and one must comply with specific measurements set by
the legislature.
In the European Union, Recital 14 of the Information Society Directive222 states
that “[t]his Directive should seek to promote learning and culture by protecting
works and other subject matter while permitting exceptions or limitations in the
public interest for the purpose of education and teaching.”223 The European Court of
Justice, in the 2018 case of Funke Medien, was asked whether a military report is
entitled to copyright protection.224 The court stated that “a balance between
copyright and the right to freedom of expression . . . need[s] to take into account the
fact that the nature of the ‘speech’ or information at issue is of particular importance,
inter alia in political discourse and discourse concerning matters of the public
interest.”225 In a different case, the Court stated that “it is important initially to recall
that the public interest in respect for property rights in general and for intellectual
property rights in particular is expressly reflected in Articles 30 EC and 295 EC.”226
That is, the underlying EU legislation on copyright requires an explicit reference to
the public interest.
In India, the Supreme Court has discussed the notion of public interest in a
copyright context:
[W]hat would be a public interest? Would it depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and the provisions of the statute? General
meaning of the word ‘public policy’ has always been held to be an unruly
horse by this Court. . . . . The right to property, therefore, is not dealt with
its subject to restrict when a right to property creates a monopoly to which
public must have access. Withholding the same from public may amount
to unfair trade practice. In our constitutional Scheme of statute monopoly
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On the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, Council Directive 2001/29/EC (May 22, 2001).
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Id.; see also Soulier v. Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication, July 7, 2016
E.C.L.I. EU: Case C-301/15 536 (Fr.).
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Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, July 29, 2019, E.C.L.I.
EU: Case C-469/17 623 (Ger.); IPPLANET, BREAKING NEWS – Military Reports and
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–
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(Aug.
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2019),
https://intellectualpropertyplanet.wordpress.com/2019/08/07/breaking-news-militaryreports-and-copyright-a-european-courts-decision/ [https://perma.cc/X3CQ-K75B].
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Funke Medien, C-469/17 at para. 74 (emphasis added).
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NDC Health Corporation v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., Apr. 11, 2002, E.C.R. EU: Case
C-481/01 3405, 3416 (Ger.).

2022]

INHUMAN COPYRIGHT SCENE

389

is not encouraged. Knowledge must be allowed to be disseminated. An
artistic work if made public should be made available subject of course to
reasonable terms and grant of reasonable compensation to the public at
large.227
The High Court of Delhi further stated:
Copyright is a property right. Throughout the world it is regarded as a form
of property worthy of social protection in the ultimate public interest. The
law starts from the premise that protection should be as long and as broad
as possible and should provide only those exceptions and limitations
which are essential in the public interest.228
These examples show how Indian courts made an indirect use of a nonaffirmative public interest defense to justify copyright infringement which the court
wished to defend when other defense mechanisms and doctrines failed.
Gottliebova’s eleven portraits, Nussbaum’s portraits, Akselrod and
Warshawsky’s “By The Ghetto Gate” song, and many other artworks created within
the ghettos and concentration camps all serve a compelling public interest. The
public interest which stands behind Holocaust artwork is perfectly aligned with the
above rationale presented by different courts around the world. It is aimed to educate
and teach the public at large, as well as to ensure just reward for the author, given
the indisputable fact that these works were created to immortalize the people and
events depicted in them. The only way to do so is through broad dissemination of
these works. The public interest compels us to do so. Continuing to prevent access
to these works adds insult to injury and should be rejected by courts that have
incorporated the public interest, whether by statute or common law, into their
principles.
B. International Public Interest
The public interest has been at the forefront of the drafting process of many
international treaties on copyright, albeit with almost no explicit reference to the
concept itself. This has left the role of the public interest contested amongst those
who seek to apply it, especially given that the bedrock historical treaty, the Berne
Convention 1886, does not explicitly mention the public interest. Nevertheless, the
UK chose to adopt an independent public interest defense against copyright
infringements. In one of his decisions, Judge Aldous concluded that the public
interest defense was incompatible with Berne:229
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M/S. Ent. Network India v. M/S. Super Cassette Indus., (2008) 37 PTC 353, INSC
969 (India).
228
Warner Bros. Ent. v. Santosh, (2009) INDLHC 1365, para. 24 (India).
229
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[T]here is no general power for courts of the signatories [to the Berne
Convention] to refuse to enforce copyright if it is thought to be in the
public interest of that State that it should not be enforced. Thus a general
defense of public interest would appear to be contrary to this country’s
international obligations.230
Phillips further provided that the Berne Convention does not explicitly permit
the ‘public interest’ defense that UK copyright law permits,231 and that even if the
exceptions stated in the convention are considered cumulatively, they will still not
justify the public interest defense.232 Burrell rejected these assumptions stating that
a public interest defense can be justified under Article 9(2) or Article 17 of the
Convention. Article 9(2) “allows member states to provide exceptions to the
reproduction right,” and Article 17 allows member states to “permit, control or to
prohibit the circulation or protection of a work.”233 These Articles allow member
countries to incorporate them in the guise of a public interest defense, an act that
will be in compliance with the demand of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS
agreement.234 As stated above, except for the UK and New Zealand, world copyright
laws do not refer to the public interest as a general exception to copyright protection.
The Preamble to the two WIPO Internet Treaties “recognizes the need to
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,
particularly education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne
Convention.”235 The Preamble to the Marrakesh Treaty also refers to the public
interest advocating that signatories recognize “the need to maintain a balance
between the effective protection of the rights of authors and the larger public
interest, particularly education, research and access to information, and that such a
balance must facilitate effective and timely access to works for the benefit of persons
with visual impairments or with other print disabilities.”236 In addition to the Berne
and WIPO Treaties, the term ‘public interest’ appears in the TRIPs Agreement in
230

Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland & Ors [2000] EWCA Civ 37 (Eng.).
See Jeremy Phillips, The Berne Convention and the Public Interest, 11 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 169 (1986).
232
Id. at 180 (arguing that even “i[f] the ‘public interest’ defense exists, it does so
without regard to whether the work infringed is published or not”).
233
BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 185, at 106.
234
See also Poorna Mysoor, Capturing the Dynamism of Fairness: A Common Law
Perspective, in FAIRNESS, MORALITY AND ORDRE PUBLIC IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8, 12
(Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2020).
235
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty & World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonogram Treaty, preamble, Dec. 20, 1996
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Internet Treaties]; see also MREILLE VAN EECHOUD, P. BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ, STEF VAN GOMPEL, LUCIE GUIBAULT & NATALI HELBERGER, HARMONIZING
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two different places. First, Article 8 states that copyright can be overridden “to
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.” Second,
with regards to the obligation of transparency, Article 63(4) stipulates that the
obligations taken by the signature states will not “require Members to disclose
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be
contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests
of particular enterprises, public or private.” Arguably, verbatim reference to the
public interest in the TRIPS agreement elevates the normative status of the public
interest and invites countries to legislate it as a defense mechanism.237
Interestingly, Decision 160 of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization238 examined the term “interest.” In this decision, the Body evaluated
the compliance of Section110(5) of the US Copyright Act (permitting “playing of
radio and television music in public places (bars, shops, restaurants, etc.) without
the payment of a royalty fee”239) with the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel referenced
a Swedish/BIRPI Study Group240 which stated that “it should not be forgotten that
domestic laws already contained a series of exceptions in favor of various public
and cultural interests and that it would be vain to suppose that countries would be
ready at this stage to abolish these exceptions to any appreciable extent.”241 These
various “public and cultural interests” are unique to each country and can seldom
protect exemptions which are not in line with international conventions, as the Study
Group suggested. As a result, a specific country may prefer to advance and provide
copyright protection to works created by their citizens, for humanitarian reasons, in
defiance of international copyright laws.242 An example of this is Barrie’s Peter Pan,
where the Great Ormond Street Hospital was granted, by legislation, a perpetual
right to royalties for the commercial use of the story.243
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Decision 160 further assists in defining private authorial interests, as opposed
to the public interest. The Panel analyzed the term “interest” as part of its discussion
on the third condition set in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, according to which
limitations and exceptions to copyright can be set with regards to protected artworks,
as long as those do “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder.”244 The Panel stated that:
[T]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘interests’ may encompass a legal right
or title to a property or to use or benefit of a property (including intellectual
property). It may also refer to a concern about a potential detriment or
advantage, and more generally, to something that is of some importance
to a natural or legal person. Accordingly, the notion of ‘interests’ is not
necessarily limited to actual or potential economic advantage or
detriment.245
On the basis of this comment, different types of interests, economic as well as
moral, must be considered in the course of assessing the meaning and implication of
protecting a rightsholder’s interest. In other words, any evaluation of the term
“interest” as it pertains to exceptions and limitations to copyright is not limited to
economic effects. The value of works of art, literature, and music created within the
ghettos cannot be appraised by monetary worth only. When Gottliebova insisted on
gaining possession of the portraits she painted at Auschwitz, her claim projected her
emotional attachment to the works that saved her and her mother’s lives from death
in the gas chambers. Gottliebova’s interest was morally and emotionally driven. To
use the Panel’s reasoning, Gottliebova’s “interest” consists of “something that is of
some importance to a natural or legal person” and not only “limited to actual or
potential economic advantage or detriment.”246 If this argument is correct, then the
Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum cannot claim ownership, dictate the social and
cultural future of the portraits, or decide on how to benefit from them. Only
Gottliebova can make such decisions.
C. The Public Interest as a Legal Standard
The right of authors who created work within the ghettos and concentration
camps to own their creations is unquestionable. This right is fundamental for
historical justice and carries wide social commitments on the part of the public, who
will remain indefinitely under a duty to remember, respect, and contemplate the
consequences of this inhuman event. This duty requires public exposure to these
works and the ability to communicate with them. This duty can be achieved only if
the public interest receives sufficient stature within the copyright framework that
regulates the ownership of these works. Unfortunately, the public interest as such
244
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246
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does not appear in the vast majority of national copyright laws. This means it is left
for courts to adjudicate limitations on copyright in light of the public interest. As
aforementioned, two jurisdictions provide a unique public interest defense in cases
where the enacted lists of permitted uses of copyrighted works do not provide
sufficient public access. In the UK, Section 171(3) of the CDPA247 stipulates that
“Nothing in this Part affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement
of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.”248 Section 225(3) of the
New Zealand Copyright Act of 1994 replicates the words of its British
counterpart.249
We argue that the public interest defense, as a defense mechanism that limits
property rights vested in works of art and authorship, is an appropriate legal
mechanism applicable to artworks created within concentration camps and ghettos
and later withheld from public access, either by illegitimate owners, archives and
museums, auction houses, or by the creators themselves. The public interest defense
originates in common law around the world.250 In a landmark case on exceptions to
247

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 171(3) (UK).
See also Jonathan Griffiths, The United Kingdom’s Public Interest “Defence” and
European Union Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
PUBLICITY: CONVERGES AND DEVELOPMENT 289 (Nari Lee, Guido Westkamp, Annette Kur
& Ansgar Ohly eds., 2014).
249
“Nothing in this Act affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement
of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.” Copyright Act 1994, s. 225(3)
(N.Z.). For more on New Zealand, see, for example, Rachel A. Yurkowski, Is Hyde Park
Hiding the Truth? An Analysis of the Public Interest Defence to Copyright Infringement, 32
VIC. UNIV. WELLINGT. L. REV. 51 (2001) (“It is be noted that, although this paper refers
primarily to English law, the reasoning for and scope of the public interest defence to
copyright infringement apply equally to copyright in the New Zealand context.”); ANNA
KINGSBURY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN NEW ZEALAND chpt. 1 § 7.VII (2017) (“One
uncertain area of New Zealand copyright law is the scope of any public interest defence to
copyright infringement.”); Jo Oliver, Copyright, Fair Dealing, and Freedom of Expression,
19 N.Z, UNIVS. L. REV. 89, 112 (2000); Susy Frankel, The Copyright and Privacy Nexus, 36
VICT. UNIV. WELLINGTON L. REV. 507, 512, 518 (2005); Alexandra Sims, Strange
Bedfellows: Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression in New Zealand, E.I.P.R. 2011, 33(8),
490–98.
250
Although this defense is not common in many countries, there is scholarly writing
on its application in different jurisdictions. For a discussion about Singapore, see Saw, supra
note 210 (Saw states that the Singapore Parliament can adopt this defense, but that it is not
really necessary as the court can use this defense as part of the fair dealing exceptions); for
a discussion about China, see Tang Guanhong, A Comparative Study of Copyright and the
Public Interest in the United Kingdom and China, 1 SCRIPTED 272 (2004) (claiming the
cultural and judicial gap between China and the UK is a significant hurdle to the adoption of
this defense in China); for a discussion about France, see SUNIMAL MENDIS, COPYRIGHT,
THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION: EXPLORING A POTENTIAL
PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT IN EUROPE 37, 51–52 (2011) (“[T]he
perceptible trend towards greater recognition of the need to achieve an adequate equilibrium
between the rights of authors and performers and the public interest as well as the strong
248

394

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

copyright protection, the English Court of Appeal declared that the public interest
defense is limited to cases where enforcement of the copyright would offend against
the policy of a given law. That is, a court can refuse the granting of copyright
protection if the work at issue is “(i) immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life;
(ii) injurious to public life, public health and safety or the administration of justice;
or (iii) incites or encourages others to act in a way referred to in (ii).”251 The public
interest is enshrined within copyright law, especially in the lists of permitted uses.
As Lord Justice Robert Walker explained, “The wide variety of uses of copyright
material permitted by the 49 sections comprised in Chapter III (acts permitted in
relation to copyright works) are all directed to achieving a proper balance between
protection of the rights of a creative author and the wider public interest.”252 These
restrictions, however, did not satisfy the British legislature, and Section 171(3) was
added to the arsenal of defenses against infringement claims.
The true meaning of the public interest defense is to aid where a use is not
permitted under the fair use lists. In this case, one could still make use of a protected
work on public interest grounds that can override the rightsholder’s copyright.253
This defense was designed to ensure that the judiciary remain free to develop a
general public interest mechanism.254 The judiciary embarked on this task and
tradition of cultural heritage in French copyright law may furnish the necessary conditions
to render the copyright legal framework of France conducive to the introduction of a public
interest exception to copyright.”); for a discussion about Germany, see id., at 59 (“[I]t may
be seen that the prevailing conditions within the German legal framework are exceedingly
conducive to the introduction of a broad based public interest exception to copyright.”); in
Australia the decision made by the High Court in Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd
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and French Laboratories (Austl) Ltd v Dep’t of Cmty Servs and Health [1989] FCA 384
(Austl.). For a discussion about South Africa, see S. Karjiker, The Case for the Recognition
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251
Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland, [2001] EWCA Civ 37, para. 66 (Eng. &
Wales); Robert Danay, Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of Peer-to-Peer FileSharing of Music in the United Kingdom, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 32, 38 (2006).
252
Pro Sieben Media A.G. v. Carlton U.K. Television Ltd., [1998] EWCA (Civ) 2001
(Eng.).
253
For the history of this doctrine, see Yurkowski, supra note 249, at Part 5.A.1;
MENDIS, supra note 250, at 45; Jonathan Griffiths, Pre-Empting Conflict - A Re-Examination
of the Public Interest Defence in UK Copyright Law, 34 LEGAL STUD. 76, 78 (2014); Saw,
supra note 210, at 521; Mysoor, supra note 234, at 10.
254
Dinusha Mendis, The Historical Development of Exceptions to Copyright and Its
Application to Copyright Law in the Twenty-First Century, 7.5 EJCL (2003),
https://www.ejcl.org/75/art75-8.html. For a critical analysis of this defense, see Griffiths,
supra note 253, at 76 (claiming that “the defence is to be viewed as a form of pre-emption
doctrine, allowing courts to avoid the explicit rules established under the CDPA in
circumstances in which their application would frustrate the outcomes of other more
appropriate forms of regulation”).

2022]

INHUMAN COPYRIGHT SCENE

395

gradually developed the defense over time.255 The defense is considered applicable
when the public interest is served by the disclosure of the information contained in
the protected work, despite the fact that “(i) the act of infringement does not fall with
any of the CDPA’s ‘permitted acts’ and (ii) the enforcement of copyright in the
particular circumstances would not be tainted by wrongdoing.”256 In other words,
the public interest defense offers an escape from the closed list of exceptions and
limitations offered by the British fair dealing doctrine and allows the court flexibility
in justifying copyright infringement.
The British public interest defense was influenced by a Canadian court
decision. In Canada, the defense exists at common law for rare cases only.257 In
1984, in the case of Lion Laboratories v. Evans,258 former employees of the
undertaking exposed defects in the latter’s intoximeter, which was used by the police
to measure the blood alcohol levels of motorists.259 The employees were sued for
copyright infringement by their former employers.260 In his decision, Judge Griffiths
stated, “I am quite satisfied that the defense of public interest is now well established
in actions for breach of confidence and, although there is less authority on the point,
that it also extends to breach of copyright.”261 The court further remarked that the
use of the public interest defense is not limited to cases where there is wrongdoing
on the part of the plaintiffs, thus rejecting the “iniquity rule.” As the court put it: “It
is not difficult to think of instances where, although there has been no wrongdoing
on the part of the plaintiff, it may be vital in the public interest to publish a part of
his confidential information.”262 Shortly after this case, the CDPA was enacted and
included Section 171(3), which some considered a statutory endorsement of the
public interest defense as it was interpreted and applied in Lion Laboratories.263 The
latter had an impact on future case law. In the case of Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v.
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Yelland & Ors,264 fifteen years after Lion Laboratories, the British court adhered to
a similar interpretation of the public interest, stating that “the defendant’s
publication of stills from a security video contributed to a debate on a matter of
important public interest and was therefore justified under the public interest
defense.”265 This decision was overturned on appeal266 when the Court of Appeal
favored a narrower interpretive approach to the public interest defense. The Court
introduced general guidelines to instances for which the defense was appropriate:
“[A] court would be entitled to refuse to enforce copyright if the work is: (i)
immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life; (ii) injurious to public life, public
health and safety or the administration of justice; (iii) incites or encourages others to
act in a way referred to in (ii).”267
The last noteworthy case which discussed the defense at length was nearly two
decades ago. The 2002 case Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.268 was decided after
the Human Rights Act 1998 entered into force and before a different panel than the
one which discussed Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland, only three years before.
Ashdown concerns a newspaper’s publication “of parts of a previously unpublished
memorandum written by the leader of a political party.”269 The leader of the Liberal
Democrats Party, Paddy Ashdown, sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and
copyright infringement.270 The newspaper’s argument was based on the statutory
fair dealing provisions and the common law public interest defense.271 The Court
recognized that the obligation to protect freedom of expression through Article 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights requires in some circumstances for
“the use of a copyright work to be excused even though such use was not covered
by any of the CDPA’s permitted acts.”272 The Court rejected the restrictive
conception of the public interest defense, as was interpreted in Hyde Park Residence
Ltd. v. Yelland, and held:
[T]he ratio of Lion Laboratories ought not to have been interpreted so
narrowly and, accordingly, that Parliament had not intended to endorse
only the narrower ex turpi form of the defense. As a result, the public
interest defense might potentially apply in situations in which the use of a
copyright work was protected by Art. 10, but was not covered by any of
the CDPA’s permitted acts.273
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Although the Court of Appeal in this case confirmed that the public interest defense
is a legitimate copyright principle, it failed to provide measures to define the
parameters of such a defense. The Court vaguely described the circumcenters of its
application as not “capable of precise categori[z]ation or definition,”274 a statement
that was regarded by many as vague and shrouded by uncertainty.275
Since Ashdown, there have been several cases that invited courts to discuss the
public interest defense.276 The only case appearing before the Court of Appeal was
HRH Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.277 in 2006, where Charles,
Prince of Wales, filed a lawsuit against a newsgroup following their publication of
extracts from his unpublished journals.278 The Court rejected the newsgroup’s public
interest defense claim stating that this case is not “one of those rare cases where the
public interest trumps the rights conferred by the CDPA [identified in Ashdown].”279
This decision, similar to court decisions given after it,280 shows the unclear scope of
this defense. Recent copyright infringement cases in the UK, in which the public
interest defense was raised by the defendants, confirm that only in rare instances will
courts find that the public interest supersedes the protected rights of the copyright
owner.281 Recently, this defense was raised by Mail’s newspaper after it was sued
274
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by the Duchess of Sussex, Meghan Markle, for publishing a letter she wrote to her
father.282 Given the Court’s decision in HRH Prince of Wales, it is doubtful that the
defense will be successful. The last time the public interest defense was discussed
in the UK was in 2017, in EC v. Sunday Newspapers Limited, where the High Court
of Justice in Northern Ireland Queen’s Bench Division accepted and applied the
public interest defense with regards to articles concerning the plaintiff, which were
published by the defendant.283 The court took the existence of this defense as a fact
and did not discuss its validity, rather only its applicability to the circumstances of
the case.284
Despite its rare judicial application and public awareness,285 the public interest
defense holds great promise for societal justice and is certainly not moot.286
Although the “public interest is in itself an elusive concept,”287 it has a fundamental
role in the dissemination of copyrighted works.288 The following considerations
must be taken by a court tasked with determining the scope of the public interest
defense. First, the circumstances which led to claiming this defense, i.e., the
particular facts of the case. Second, the status of the plaintiff, whether the case
involves a private or a public entity claiming that a certain work should not be
publicly accessible. Third, whether the work has been already published in the past.
Fourth, whether the publication of the artwork by the defendant was inappropriate
or motivated by impure motives.289 Works created within the ghettos and
concentration camps provide a stand-alone and illuminating exemplar for these
considerations, making such works the ultimate candidates for the public interest
defense.
Advocate v. Hainey [2012] HCJ 2 (Scot.); see also ABBE BROWN, SMITA KHERIA, JANE
CORNWELL & MARTA ILJADICA CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND
POLICY 197 (5th ed., 2019).
282
See Chris Ship, Mail on Sunday to Use Public Interest Defence in Meghan Legal
Claim, ITV NEWS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.itv.com/news/2020-01-14/mail-on-sundayto-use-public-interest-defence-in-meghan-legal-claim/ [https://perma.cc/N524-L9WL].
283
EC v. Sunday Newspapers Ltd. [2017] NIQB 117 (N. Ir.).
284
See id.
285
Alexandra Sims, The Public Interest Defence in Copyright Law: Myth or Reality?,
6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 335, 335 (2006).
286
See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Free Speech Groups Call for Public Interest Defence for
Whistleblowers, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/may
/02/free-speech-groups-call-for-public-interest-defence-for-whistleblowers [https://perma.
cc/H86A-3X6M] (discussing how in 2017, free speech groups called for its application for
whistleblower). It is still used and advocated for as a defense mechanism for copyright
infringement cases across the UK. The fact it is hardly used in courts proves it is preserved
to ‘rare circumstances.’ See Pro Sieben Media A.G. v. Carlton U.K. Television Ltd., [1998]
EWCA (Civ) 2001 (Eng.).
287
Saw, supra note 210, at 519.
288
Sims claimed that the enactment of the public interest defense, and its use until now,
was necessary in order to prevent copyright law from excessively prohibiting access and
expression rights held by the public.
289
See also Yurkowski, supra note 249.
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First, on the basis of prior adjudication, only one circumstance fits the subject
of this Article—“the disclosure by means of publication will prevent the public from
being misled and in doing so protect their health and safety.”290 Preventing the public
from being misled by unauthentic ghetto art, or the complete lack thereof, in effect
prevents society from learning from the past, allowing Holocaust denial to
flourish.291 There is a fundamental public interest in facilitating authentic dialogues
on ghetto art.
Second, in most cases, the plaintiffs would be libraries, museums, and archives
unwilling to publish the works they possess. These institutions are quasi-public
entities due to the societal value they hold, and therefore, are required to meet a
higher standard of reasoning as to why these works are withheld from the public.292
Third, many of these works are unpublished. Those who own them are
concerned that by publishing them, they will commit copyright infringement.293 The
public interest defense applies more fiercely to unpublished works—“when a private
and unpublished document that would otherwise be protected by copyright is
published and exposes something the public ought to know, the rationale for the
existence of the defense is satisfied.”294 When the work is already published, this
defense will be justified if “the publication serves to disseminate the information to
a wider group of the public.”295 Published works created within the ghettos and
concentration camps, as well as unpublished works, fulfill these requirements.
Fourth, in most cases, the defendant will not perform an act of misconduct by
publishing these works, given their fundamental value to society. Publishing and
disseminating these works can hardly be said to derive from impure motives.
If copyright in ghetto artworks was more often balanced against certain human
rights, we might have seen a shift in copyright disputes towards the public interest.296
Drahos proclaimed that the communities of human rights and intellectual property
are intertwined and “should begin a dialogue. The two communities have a great
deal to learn from each other. Viewing intellectual property through the eyes of
human rights advocates will encourage consideration of the ways in which the
property mechanism might be reshaped to include interests and needs that it
290

Id. at 1080. Lion Laboratories v. Evans, [1984] 2 All ER 417 (Eng.). The publication
of the memorandum served to prevent the public being misled as to the effectiveness of the
breath-testing devices.
291
See supra Section III.A.
292
See, e.g., International Council of Museums, ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums
(2017),
https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICOM-code-En-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UZ9S-BJRB] (stating in Article II that “[m]useums that maintain
collections hold them in trust for the benefit of society and its development.”).
293
See generally Edward L. Carter, Reclaiming Copyright from Privacy: Public Interest
in Use of Unpublished Materials, 85 JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’N Q. 417, 420–21 (2008)
(discussing unpublished works in the context of the public interest defense).
294
Yurkowski, supra note 249, at 1082.
295
Id.
296
See Lior Zemer, Rethinking Copyright Alternatives, 14 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH.
137, 140–41 (2005).
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currently does not.”297 There is an imminent human right need behind the publication
of works created within the ghettos. The violation of every human right in the course
of the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people must affect the way ownership of these
works is defined. The extraordinary circumstances under which these works
emerged require us to offer a lenient and embracing understanding regarding the
ownership of these works, for the sake of both the public as well as the original
authors. A robust dialogue between the communities of human rights and intellectual
property rights will bring to the fore the need to apply the public interest defense for
a public of listeners yearning for the authentic message and meaning of these works.
Given the difficulties associated with the open-textured definition of the public
interest defense, it is predominantly available “in exceptional circumstances, such
that it is unlikely to provide users with much additional protection.”298 These
circumstances occur “where the owner is attempting to use copyright to protect some
other interest and where public health or safety or the administration of justice or
rights to freedom of information and political communication are otherwise in
danger of being jeopardized . . . .”299 Keeping works created within the ghettos and
concentration camps behind the bars of archives and museums, prohibiting their
publication and dissemination to the public, falls into the penumbra of these
exceptional circumstances. Society owes a duty to cherish this history and
simultaneously has a right to the information which would allow its members to
respect their duty.300
The public interest defense completes a full circle in which protected artworks
are transferred from the realm of private ownership—by the authors themselves or
their heirs—to the public. When it comes to Holocaust art, it is rare to find the author
or trace any living kin.301 In cases in which we can identify the author, such as in the

297

Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 349,
370–71 (1999).
298
BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 185, at 80.
299
Id. at 288.
300
Opponents to the public interest defense rely on substitutes such as the doctrines of
clean hands or fraud. Like the public interest defense, “considerable uncertainty surrounds”
these doctrines. Id. at 94. Clean hands, for example, “is at times capable of causing
considerable harm.” See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity with Unclean Hands, pt.
1, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877, 878. (1949); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming into Equity
with Unclean Hands, pt. 2, 47 MICH. L. REV. 877 (1949). For more on the criticism about
clean hands, see BURRELL, supra note 263, at 95–96. This doctrine is surrounded with
uncertainty and does not offer a better remedy than that offered through the public interest
defense. See, e.g., PAUL S. DAVIES, & GRAHAM VIRGO, EQUITY & TRUSTS: TEXT, CASES &
MATERIALS 18 (2nd ed., 2016) (quoting P. Pettit, in his ‘He Who Comes into Equity Must
Come with Clean Hands’ article, as he says “[t]he clean hands doctrine is perhaps no more
than a background principle from which have developed particular equitable defences”); See
generally I. SPRY, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,
INJUNCTIONS, RECTIFICATION AND EQUITABLE DAMAGES (6th ed., 2001). For more on fraud,
see BURRELL & COLEMAN, supra note 185, at 96–97.
301
As they are usually orphan works. See Supra Section IV.B.
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case of Gottliebova’s watercolors,302 Ashdown provides the necessary guidelines to
decide how to balance between the public interest and the proprietary rights of the
author. The legal infrastructure of copyright provides for mechanisms that promote
public access in the form of lists of exceptions and limitations to the right. Although
these lists have the capacity to promote the public interest,303 they lack the
definitional flexibility required to overcome ill-suited copyright considerations in
regard to Holocaust art. The UK and the EU have closed lists of permitted uses,
while the US and Israel have open-ended fair use doctrines. Both models of
exceptions and limitations offer insufficient definitional flexibility.304 An almost
insurmountable gap exists between the public interest and the original authors’ rights
in the case of works created under the most extreme circumstances—in the ghettos
and concentration camps. The emotional attachment to their works of authors who
survived the Holocaust is unparalleled to any other authorial attachment. Alongside
advocating the public interest and its collective duty, we heavily criticize any attempt
to deprive authors, artists, and musicians who created within the ghettos and
concentration camps of their rights. The following part of the Article struggles to
overcome this insurmountable gap.
VI. AN UNCOMFORTABLE BALANCE
A. Unparalleled Authorial Attachment
The emotional attachment of authors creating within the ghettos, concentration
camps, and extermination camps to their works is unparalleled in any other authorwork relationship. These works were created in the midst of the most inhuman and
barbaric circumstances. The brutalized personalities of these authors have been
embedded in their works. Those who survived the Holocaust, and the few who still
walk among us, tell how fundamental this attachment is to their lives. Gottliebova is
one example. Authors, artists, and musicians who did not survive the camps
bequeathed to us the noble commitment to tell their story and never put their
message behind bars again. Holding their works in archives and museums, or by
other private entities that do not have a legitimate right in them, violates the authors’
last wish to us all. As descendants of Holocaust survivors, we believe we have an
inalienable duty to speak on their behalf. To do so, we introduce a three-prong
argument. Our aim is to achieve the difficult balance between those authors and the
public. We ought to apologize for taking a public-centered approach that discounts,
albeit to a minimal extent, the property effect of the emotional attachment of these
302

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Jonathan Griffiths, Fair Dealing in the Law of Copyright, 8 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 54,
58 (1999).
304
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (analyzing which factors practically determine
the outcome of the fair use test); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and
Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20, 22 (2013) (disputing the ability of courts to
apply fair use in ways that accommodate multiple meanings and interpretations of art).
303
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authors to their works. This, however, is not at the price of reaping the latter of their
property rights. Here lies an uncomfortable balance we aim to define.
First, we argue that the public retains a collective right to be informed and that
this right encompasses exposure and communication with works created within the
ghettos. This collective right requires releasing these works into the public realm in
the exact form in which they were created so as to deliver the authentic message and
meaning expressed in the works. Second, we advocate a no-right to destroy these
works. This no-right does not forfeit the author’s rights to possess their works but
ensures that humanity does not forget or discount the atrocities of Nazi Germany.
Third, we invite the compulsory licensing argument into the present discourse as a
mechanism that forces illegitimate owners to part with those works to which they
are not entitled, transfer possession to the legitimate rightsholders, and at the same
time, ensures that the right of the public to be informed is secured.
B. The Public Right to Know
Copyright, as defined in this Article, involves “duties to the public as well as
rights in the work.”305 Authors of creative works created within the ghettos and
concentration camps have exclusive property rights in their intangible expressions.
These rights allow them to control the economic and social future of the works. No
user can interfere with or eliminate these rights. At the same time, however, these
works, because of their singular and unparalleled historical and social value, cannot
be withheld from the public either by illegitimate owners or even by the creators
themselves. As dialogical properties created in the darkest times, the public has a
right to know the authentic truth embedded within these works. This truth is one of
the major vessels by which to spread accurate information on Nazi Germany, to
teach the lessons, and to promote the messages from which all generations must
learn. Accuracy on these terms is less a matter of the economic rights vested in the
works, to which the authors have exclusivity, but more related to the set of moral
rights copyright law recognizes and protects. These rights protect authorial integrity,
allow viewers of the works to know, if possible, the identity of the original author,
and safeguard the authentic message and meaning the works project. Moral rights in
the case of Holocaust art, we claim, maintain fairness for both authors and the public.
The right of attribution and the right of integrity are the two most prominently
recognized moral rights.306 The former safeguards the author’s right to be recognized
305

Kwall, supra note 94, at 704 (reviewing Lior Zemer’s, “The Idea of Authorship in
Copyright”).
306
Continental countries often recognize additional moral rights—e.g., the right of
disclosure and the right of withdrawal and repentance. The former recognizes the author as
the ultimate judge of when and under what conditions a work can be disseminated, and the
latter provides the author with the power to withdraw the work from the public, even after
publication, if it no longer reflects his convictions. See, e.g., Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral
Right of Integrity: The Past and Future of “Honour,” 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 111, 128–32
(2005). Interestingly, the European Union has not, to date, harmonized moral rights
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as the author of the work, while the latter guarantees that the author’s work truly
represents his creative personality, free of distortions and mutilations amounting to
misrepresentation of his creative vision and uniquely personal experiences. As
Kwall explained, both rights are intended to “safeguard the author’s meaning and
message, and thus are designed to increase an author’s ability to safeguard the
integrity of her texts.”307 Safeguarding integrity as a goal of moral rights requires
striking a balance between authors and the public: “From the creator’s perspective,
to receive credit for what one does (and to have credit not falsely attributed) and
from the audience’s perspective, to be able to identify the source of material with
which one engages.”308 In contemporary times, the need to identify the source is
more acute, as “traditional publishers play less of a role in distributing, and thus
controlling the quality of, material disseminated to audiences . . . .”309 The unique
author-work relations depicted in ghetto art require a sensitive understanding of how
far the public’s right to know may interfere with individual proprietary aspirations.
As stated above,310 if we consider copyright law to possess a “communicative
impact”311 on society and see it as the source for a variety of discursive activities,
being exposed to the exact original message and meaning of authorial works is
crucial. Preservation of the original meaning emphasizes the special connection
protection, although all member states have such provisions. The Wittem Project Report,
however, which introduces a copyright code for Europe, suggests thorough harmonization
of moral rights. The Report recognizes the following three moral rights: the right of
divulgation, the right of attribution and the right of integrity. THE WITTEM PROJECT,
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT CODE 17–18 (2010); see also Eleonora Rosati, The Wittem Group
and the European Copyright Code, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 862, 865–66 (2010)
(explaining the European Copyright Code’s integration of moral rights); Bernt Hugenholtz,
The Wittem Group’s European Copyright Code, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT
LAW: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 339 (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou ed., 2012).
307
KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, supra note 140, at 6. Certain legal systems
provide strong moral rights protection to authors similar in strength to the set of economic
rights. “In contrast, American copyright law rewards economic incentives almost exclusively
and lacks adequate moral rights protections.” Id. at xiii. In the 1990s, the United States has
joined the group of countries protecting moral rights, but chose a more restrictive application
of moral rights. The Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) was passed two years after the United
States joined the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in scattered
sections of title 17 of the U.S.C.). Enacting VARA was meant to accommodate the
obligations imposed on the United States by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which
requires all signatory states to provide at least some protection for the moral rights of authors.
In essence, VARA imported “a limited version of the civil-law concept of the ‘moral rights
of the artist’ into our intellectual-property law.” Kelley v. Chicago Park District, No. 083701 & 08-3712, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 2011).
308
Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 382
(2011).
309
Id.
310
See supra Section III.A.
311
KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, supra note 140, at 61 (internal quotations
omitted).
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between authors and their copyrightable “spiritual children,”312 while also defining
access as a public right.313 As Mira Sundara Rajan writes, moral rights were created
in order to avoid “false attribution . . . ; inaccurate and inappropriate translations;
misleading representations of the poet’s personality; and erroneous statements about
his life and works.”314 In this way, moral rights impact cultural integrity.
Governments have a duty to protect “national culture for its own prestige, and for
the benefit of the public.”315 Works created in the ghettos and concentration camps
are representations of the Jewish culture that once thrived on European soil. Any
misattribution, manipulation, distortion of information, or illegitimate claims of
rights in these works is a public wrong. Thus, we claim that moral rights are
sacrosanct entitlements to authors of these works but are also imperative to the
public itself.
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court stated that “certain things are free for
all to use.”316 Art created under the inhuman circumstances of the Holocaust must
remain one of these “certain things.” From a social perspective, we argue that
limiting the dual goal of moral rights, both to the author and the public, amounts to
a violation of an authorship norm. Moral rights are not only vehicles that afford
fairness to authors. The right of attribution, for example, is a “moral obligation.”317
True, the right has an “obvious utility in protecting artists from theft of the reputation
they have cultivated.”318 But this is not its only goal—the right of attribution exists
to protect “the public at large from being misled”:319 “[T]here is more at stake than
the concern of the artist . . . There is also the interests of others in seeing, or
preserving the opportunity to see, the work as the artist intended it, undistorted . . .
We yearn for the authentic, for contact with the work in its true version . . . .”320 As
312

Zemer, supra note 144, at 1528.
Shifting the focus from authors to the benefit for society in general can also be found
in the rhetoric preferred by the new trademark-style consumer protectionists. See, e.g.,
Lastowka, supra note 114, at 1175–76.
314
Rajan, supra note 115, at 167.
315
Id. at 181.
316
See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
317
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations
on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 167, 175 (2002) (arguing that attribution norms are moral obligations).
318
Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 130 (1997); see also Greg
Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 78
(2007) (remarking that the right of attribution is important in order to “promote the smooth
functioning of reputation economies”).
319
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 318, at 131.
320
John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023,
1041 (1976). Praising the public interest in the right of integrity, Hansmann and Santilli
remark: “[W]orks of art often become important elements in a community’s culture: other
works of art are created in response to them, and they become common reference points . . . .
313
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Kwall emphasized, if the intention of the framers of the Copyright Clause of the US
Constitution321 was to “stimulate an open culture steeped in knowledge and
education,”322 then “through a legal framework that promotes the public’s interest in
knowing the original source of a work and understanding it in the context of the
author’s original meaning and message,”323 the objectives of the Clause can be
maintained.
A crucial question relating to moral rights and to the public’s right not to be
misled is whether moral rights ought to have an expiration date. If the author retains
a “right to inform the public about the original nature of her artistic message and the
meaning of her work,”324 why should Picasso’s moral rights end in 2043? Or, for
that matter, why should Gottliebova’s moral rights end in 2079? An expiration date
means that personalities die. Once the human brain stops operating, the personality
ceases too. However, works of creative content—embodying their author’s
personality—never cease to exist even when destroyed, and the public right to be
informed continues along with it. Holocaust artworks are the ultimate candidates for
perpetual moral rights protection in order to protect the public interest and reinforce
the public’s perpetual duty to respect and never forget, to learn from history and pass
on the lessons to future generations. In other words, ownership, when applied to
authorial and artistic commodities, cannot be interpreted solely through the lens of
economic benefits and rewards. This argument especially applies in the context of
ghetto art, where economic benefits did not exist when the work was authored. Kwall
urges us to rethink the anatomy of copyright and criticizes the hegemony of
economic justifications to human creativity, defining “works of authorship as
fungible commodities.”325 These justifications protect only one convenient subset of
the creative process. Translating this line of reasoning into a workable legal standard
requires a redefinition of the rigid set of time limitations to which moral rights are
subjected to reward the author for his human capital and cater to the public interest
and the public’s role as the entity that eventually takes the work in new directions.
Practically, accommodating these concerns can be achieved by a limited-in-time
actionable right for authors for infringement of their moral rights, lasting as long as
economic rights do. Once the actionable right expires, the public’s unlimited right
to be informed begins. The right of the public can be secured by implementing a
system of perpetual mandatory disclaimers. These will require a user of an original
work, for which copyright has expired and moral rights are no longer actionable, to
provide sufficient attribution to the author.
The loss or alteration of such works would therefore be costly to the community at large,
depriving that community . . . of a widely used part of its previously shared vocabulary.”
Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 318, at 106.
321
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
322
KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY, supra note 140, at 57.
323
Id.
324
Id. at 151.
325
Id. at 24.
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C. The No-Right to Destroy
Moral rights include the author’s right that his or her work will not be destroyed
as a part of the author’s right to integrity,326 which allows the author to prevent
certain modifications of protected works.327 This extension of the author’s right to
integrity means that even if the original artwork is purchased, the new owner of the
work cannot modify or destroy it.328 Adler has criticized this right, stating that it
“fails to recognize the profound artistic importance of modifying, even destroying,
works of art.”329 A recent example is Banksy’s destruction of his famous piece being
auctioned in 2018, “Girl with Balloon.”330 To this, Adler would say that “the public
interest may sometimes lie in the destruction of art, even when the artist [or others]
favor[] preservation.”331 She claims that “artists will sometimes want to preserve
works that many if not most members of the public wish to destroy or modify.”332
Rejecting the idea of moral rights law as a shield to all artworks, she argues against
the assumption that the public interest will always be on the side of the artwork and
its author and advocate for its preservation.333 It is true that the public interest may
change over time and the public’s attitude towards a work of art may shift as time
progresses. We also agree that “it is sometimes in the public interest to mutilate a
work rather than to preserve it.”334 Perhaps certain Nazi artworks created during the
Holocaust embodying severe anti-Semitism that once plagued Europe and reappear
today belong to this category. However, an argument favoring destruction cannot
apply to ghetto art, neither can the argument that “metaphorical destruction lies at
the heart of contemporary art.”335 Contemporary art is inherently distinct from ghetto
art. The latter was not created for the entertainment of the masses but rather for the
rebellion and commemoration of the few. Ghetto art is the type of art to which
destruction or mutilation should never be valuable.
326

UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY:
EXAMINING MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (April 2019). For more on the right
to destroy, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
327
Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, The Moral Right of Integrity: A Freedom of
Expression, in DEVELOPMENTS IN RIGHTS NEIGHBOURING ON COPYRIGHT 127 (2006).
328
Id.
329
Adler, supra note 146, at 265.
330
Andrew Liptak, One of Banksy’s Paintings Self-Destructed Just After It as
Auctioned, THE VERGE (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/7/17947744/
banksy-ballon-girl-artwork-self-destructed-sothbys
[https://perma.cc/UYZ7-X44N].
Paradoxically, the destruction of the piece, which alternatively can only be seen as a
modification, has raised its value. See Brittany Shoot, Banksy ‘Girl With Balloon’ Painting
Worth Double After Self-Destructing at Auction, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/10/08/banksy-girl-with-balloon-self-destructed-video-art-worthdouble/ [https://perma.cc/5CDH-UJQ9].
331
Adler, supra note 146, at 274.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 281.
334
Id.
335
Id. at 284.
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But what if the author himself is the one who desires to destroy his or her art?
Joseph Sax has stated that he believes authors have a right to destroy their own art
because an “artist should be entitled to decide how the world will remember him or
her.”336 He doesn’t, however, attribute the same right to public figures who created
historical documents. These may include Supreme Court judges or government
officials. A similar argument can be applied to our case due to the historical
significance of ghetto art, even though the artists themselves are not public figures.
Strahilevitz agrees with Sax’s general argument.337 He refers to the work of Posner,
which stated that if a will obligates its executer to destroy all the deceased’s artwork,
it will usually be struck down under public policy grounds.338 Strahilevitz rejects this
course of action, which goes against the author’s “right of destruction,” based on
four reasons. First, if we protect the author’s right to destroy, it “should encourage
high-risk, high-reward projects, and might prevent writers from worrying that they
should not commit words to paper unless they have complete visions of the narrative
structures for their work.”339 Second, an economic reason states that the author is in
the best position to take actions, even destruction, to maximize the value of his art,
and as a result, his estate.340 Third, the destruction of the art can convey to the public
that the author “is not the type of artist who will tolerate, let alone publish, inferior
works.”341 Lastly, preventing authors from destroying their work compels them “to
speak when he [or she] would have preferred to remain silent,”342 which can conflict
with the author’s First Amendment right, or the right for free speech outside the US,
which encompasses both the right to speak and the right to stay silent.343
Similar to Adler’s argument, Strahilevitz’s four explanations might be
applicable to modern art and contemporary authorship but are inapplicable to works
created within the ghettos and concentration camps. Works, with a singular
historical value that have an exceptional impact on mankind, cannot be the subject
of a debate on the destruction of art. Strahilevitz’s rationales are based on the
presumption that the lack of publication was a choice of the author. It assumes the
art has not “been published or publicly displayed”344 because the author had a valid
individual reason to do so, whether it is striving to perfection, raising the value of
his or her estate, or considering the work as inferior. That is rarely the case with
regards to ghetto art. The fact that these works were not published or displayed to
the public derives from the circumstances surrounding their creation and the
subsequential chaos after the end of the war. Moreover, economic incentives, which
336
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stand at the heart of Strahilevitz’s arguments, are rarely relevant to ghetto art. Works
of ghetto art were not crafted for advancing reputation or making a profit. They were
crafted in order to document the horrific events of the Holocaust, mutiny against the
Nazis, and other personal reasons of the authors trying to create some routine in the
ghettos and concentration camps. Thus, Strahilevitz’s reasons cannot be applied to
ghetto art.
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that only the author herself has the right to
destroy the original artwork if she so chooses. For example, if Gottliebova had
decided that her paintings project too much suffering and hurt to be preserved, she
would have had the right to destroy the originals. Although we find this possibility
inconvenient, Gottliebova’s potential right to destroy is based on very different
normative grounds than the ones discussed by Adler and Strahilevitz. Arguably, only
the author should have such a right to destroy, and only with regards to the original
piece, not its duplicates. Granting a right to destroy all copies of a ghetto work to
those who are entitled to it directly conflicts with the public’s interest to preserve
these works. The public interest imposes upon us the obligation to protect ghetto art
and authorship and the message such artworks convey. Through the prism of the
public interest, the right to reproduce and distribute ghetto art, even if only copies
of the original work, is imperative to commemorate the memory of the Holocaust.
Granting the author an absolute right to destroy all copies of his or her work does
not achieve the necessary balance between the public’s right to know and the
author’s propriety interest.
D. Involuntary Contracts
“Compulsory licenses are involuntary contracts between a willing buyer and an
unwilling seller, imposed or enforced by the state.”345 Compulsory licenses enable
access and use when the state acknowledges that the legal framework protecting a
given intellectual property right should be softened in light of a prevailing or
overriding public interest.346 For example, pharmaceutical compulsory licenses are
345
Angela Foster, Compulsory Licensing After eBay, 258 N.J. LAW. 41, 43 (2009); see
also Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the
Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 349–50 (1993).
346
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(2020) (“Compulsory licenses are another mechanism by which music copyright law has
adjusted to promote the purpose of copyright law [i.e. to promote the Progress of Science
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issued based on a public health interest that the state holds, which outweighs the
proprietary right of the patent holder in a certain medicine.347 The EU specifically
allows the issuance of compulsory licenses of “pharmaceutical products for export
to countries with public health problems.”348 Compulsory licenses provide a legal
instrument to achieve the necessary balance between the public interest, as evaluated
by the state and ad-hoc necessities, and the rightsholder. It alleviates the lengthy
monopoly right secured by copyright laws by allowing exclusions when the public
interest so requires or demands.349
Compulsory licenses are more common in the realm of patent law. In these
situations, patent registrars have the authority to enable the use of a patent, despite
the inventor’s rights. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement lists a number of conditions
for issuing compulsory licenses; for example, “the scope and duration of the license
must be limited to the purpose for which it was granted, it cannot be given
exclusively to licensees (e.g. the patent-holder can continue to produce), and it
should be subject to legal review.”350 As stated, in the past, compulsory licenses have
most often been issued with regards to pharmaceutical patents allowing their
distribution at a low cost where needed.351 In copyright, Article 11bis(2) and Article
and useful Arts]. In addition to the safety valves, compulsory licenses provide exceptions to
the exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright holders.”).
347
See Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing
Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 J.L., MED. &
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need patented life-saving medicines on an epidemic scale. Developing countries are
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charge.”).
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13(1) of the Berne Convention provide the legal foundations to grant compulsory
licenses. The latter clause specifically refers to the right of recording musical works
(and any words pertaining thereto), while the former refers to broadcasting and
related rights of any literary and artistic works. Article 11bis(2) states that “[I]t shall
be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions
under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised.”
These rights include the right to broadcast or communicate an author’s art to the
public.
In the US, copyright law delineates several different compulsory license
provisions.352 These include issuing compulsory licenses for non-dramatic musical
compositions,353 public broadcasting,354 retransmission by cable systems,355
subscription digital audio transmission,356 and non-subscription digital audio
transmission such as Internet radio.357 Compulsory licensing as a regulatory
infrastructure provides a strong foundation that can enable adequate protection for
works created within the ghettos and concertation camps. For example, the nondramatic musical compositions compulsory license can permit the use of and access
to musical compositions which were authored in ghettos and concentration camps
by Holocaust victims and survivors. This scheme requires the recording artist to
provide notice and pay a royalty. The recording artist also cannot change the basic
melody or fundamental characters of the work. These requirements are aligned with
our overarching call to preserve the original message and meaning of the work as
well as vest ownership in the author. This compulsory license only allows a person
to distribute a new sound recording of existing musical work if that work had been
previously distributed to the public by or under the authority of the copyright
owner.358 Although Holocaust music and artworks were never published in the
“traditional sense,” this requirement can be waived to allow the usage of compulsory
license even if the Holocaust art has not been distributed to the public. This is due
to the underlying public interest in obtaining access to these works and the unique
352
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circumstances surrounding their creation, which inhibited the authors’ ability to
publish them. The fact that such artworks have not been publicly distributed only
amplifies the public interest in gaining access to them.
Applying this framework to ghetto art, music, drama, and authorship is the
desired outcome that should encompass all works created in ghettos and
concentration camps during the Holocaust. The compelling public interest in
providing access to these works is unquestionable. Compulsory licenses compel
states to recalibrate the necessary balance between sheltering ghetto artworks and
the public’s interest. They provide an adequate, acknowledged legal instrument that
enables access without trampling over the author’s proprietary rights. Despite their
shortcomings, issuing these licenses strengthens the importance of their exposure to
the community.359 The utilization of compulsory licenses will enable an appropriate
balance between the public’s right to know and the authors’ proprietary rights in
their art. Bridging this gap will ensure the adequate protection of both the public
interest and authors’ rights.
CONCLUSION
Artists, authors, musicians, and other creative individuals formed an integral
part of the otherwise horrific life in the ghettos, concentration camps, and
extermination camps during the Holocaust. Even today, more than seventy years
after the liberation of ghettos across Europe, Holocaust art is discovered and traded
around the world.360 The vast majority of the rightful authors and owners of these
works were murdered in gas chambers, labor camps, and ghettos shortly after
creating their works. Through their works, Jewish prisoners documented the
atrocities of the Nazis, exposing the untold stories of over six million Jews who
walked or labored to death. While much has been written about looted works of art
that were stolen from Jewish families during the Nazi occupation, such literature
covers only one limited, and perhaps convenient, subset of questions relating to
ownership of works owned or created by Jews during the Holocaust. In this Article,
we aimed to remedy this fundamental lack of awareness. We took the temerity to
open and provoke a debate about who should be the moral owner of works of art,
music, drama, and authorship that were created within the boundaries of the most
inhuman copyright scene. At the same time, we advocated a strong public interest
defense in making these works available to the public, rescuing them from
illegitimate owners, and reconciling the nearly insurmountable tension between
rightful owners and the public interest.
359
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The works created by Gottliebova, Israel, Berline, Nussbaum, Fritta, Soyfer,
Zipper, Axelrod, Warshawsky, and thousands more, some of whom we will never
be able to acknowledge, are of unparalleled historical value. It is a fundamental
public interest that these works be made freely accessible to the public, who has the
right to be exposed to the authentic message and meaning embedded in them.
Berline’s painting of the concentration camp where he was held and Nussbaum’s
self-portrait drawn in the ghetto were created for the purpose of immortalizing the
people that lived and events that occurred in these places. The talent of these authors
and artists was realized in the most inhuman copyright circumstances that no
imagination could predict. Leaving this scene veiled and legally unexplored has
allowed these works to be locked away from public access or to have ownership
declared over them by illegitimate rightsholders, resulting in constant perpetuation
of historical injustice and violation of basic human values.
In 1905, in The Life of Reason, Philosopher George Santayana wrote, “[t]hose
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”361 In a 1948 speech to
the House of Commons, Churchill paraphrased Santayana when he said that “[t]hose
who fail to learn from history are condemned to repeat it.”362 As third-generation of
Holocaust survivors, we have an inalienable duty to speak on behalf of survivors
and ensure that these remarks are realized in perpetuity. Copyrighted expressions
created within the ghettos and concentration camps enable society to learn
fundamental historical lessons that are necessary to guarantee that this history not
be repeated.363 The public interest defense, along with the doctrine of compulsory
licenses, empowers the public to claim, demand, and gain access to these parts and
pieces of inhuman history. In their exchange over Dina Gottliebova’s ownership of
the eleven paintings, Congresswoman Shelley Berkeley was right to assert to the
Polish ambassador to the U.S., Przemyslaw Grudzinski, that “The pictures painted
by Dina Babbitt do not belong to the whole world.”364 They belong to Dina. They
definitely do not belong to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum. As remnants of the
horrific life in ghettos and concentration camps, however, these works must be made
available for unlimited public access. Copyright laws cannot supply distorted
shelters for illegitimate property claims and must be altered in order to pursue
historical justice and the public interest for this inhuman copyright scene.

361

GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: REASON IN COMMON SENSE 172
(Marianne S. Wokeck & Martin A. Coleman eds., MIT Critical ed. 2011) (1905).
362
See Folger Library – Churchill’s Shakespeare, INT’S CHURCHILL SOC’Y (Oct. 21,
2018),
https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/folgerlibrary-churchills-shakespeare/ [https://perma.cc/V8X2-LV66].
363
Cf. David Crabtree, The Importance of History, GUTENBERG COLL. (Feb. 26, 2001),
https://gutenberg.edu/2001/02/the-importance-of-history/ [https://perma.cc/R2A4-C4ES]
(“[I]f we do not sincerely seek to learn from the past, we will learn nothing . . . If we will
listen to what history has to say, we can come to a sound understanding of the past that will
tell us much about the problems we now face.”).
364
See TESTIMONY – ART OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 7, at 217.

